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THE CASE AGAINST SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT 
WILLIAM W. BRATTON† & MICHAEL L. WACHTER†† 
Many look toward enactment of the law-reform agenda held out by propo-
nents of shareholder empowerment as a part of the regulatory response to the 
current financial crisis.  This Article argues that the financial crisis exposes 
major weaknesses in the shareholder empowerment case.  Our claim is that 
shareholder empowerment delivers management a simple and emphatic march-
ing order:  manage to maximize the market price of the stock.  This is exactly 
what the managers of a critical set of financial firms did in recent years.  They 
managed to a market that focused on increasing observable earnings, and, as it 
turned out, they failed to factor in concomitant increases in risk that went 
largely unobserved.  The fact that management bears primary responsibility for 
the disastrous results does not suffice to effect a policy connection between in-
creased shareholder power and sound regulatory reform.  A policy connection 
instead turns on a counterfactual question:  whether increased shareholder 
power would have imported more effective risk management in advance of the 
crisis.  We conclude that no plausible grounds exist for making such a case.  In 
the years preceding the financial crisis, shareholders validated the strategies of the 
very financial firms that pursued high-leverage, high-return, and high-risk strat-
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egies and penalized those that did not.  It is hard to see how shareholders, having 
played a role in fomenting the crisis, have a positive role to play in its resolution. 
The prevailing legal model of the corporation strikes a better balance be-
tween the powers of directors and shareholders than does the shareholder-
centered alternative.  Shareholder proponents see management agency costs as a 
constant in history and shareholder empowerment as the only tool available to 
reduce them.  This Article counters this picture, making reference to agency 
theory and recent history to describe a dynamic process of agency-cost reduction.  
It goes on to show that shareholder empowerment would occasion significant 
agency costs of its own by forcing management to a market price set under 
asymmetric information in most cases and set in speculative markets in which 
heterogeneous expectations obscure the price’s informational content in others. 
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In 2006, shareholder empowerment figured prominently in a well-
publicized law-reform agenda presented by the Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation, a private group concerned about the competi-
tiveness of U.S. capital markets.  The Committee’s report connected 
shareholder power to market control, reasoning that enhanced 
shareholder rights provide accountability and that accountability 
means lower agency costs, higher market prices, and, accordingly, a 
more competitive equity marketplace.1  In addition, the Committee 
argued that strong shareholder rights invite more dependence on 
market discipline of managers and “go hand in hand with reduced 
regulation or litigation.”2  Restating, “accountability” means market 
control, which means lower agency costs.  The Committee thereby 
weighed in on corporate law’s leading structural question:  who 
should decide how best to maximize long-term value for the share-
holders’ benefit—the managers or the shareholders themselves?3  The 
 
1 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 93 (2006), available at 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (arguing 
that enhanced shareholder rights in the areas of takeover defenses and remedy selection 
will reduce expected agency costs and incentivize entry into U.S. public markets).  The 
Committee’s report focused on shareholder ratification of poison pills adopted by a stag-
gered board, majority voting for boards of directors, shareholder access to the director 
nomination process, executive pay, and contractual alternatives to litigation.  Id. at 16-18. 
2 Id. at 16.  
3 This is often referred to as the debate over “shareholder primacy.”  But share-
holder primacy has two aspects, the first going to the objective of the corporation and 
the shareholders’ place as legal beneficiary, and the second going to the allocation of 
power within the corporation.  This Article takes the first aspect as settled in favor of 
the shareholders and focuses on the second aspect.  To avoid confusion, we avoid the 
term entirely, instead using the phrase “shareholder empowerment.” 
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question holds out a choice between a shareholder-driven, agency 
model of the corporation, guided by informational signals from the 
financial markets, and the prevailing legal model, which vests business 
decisionmaking in managers who possess an informational advantage 
regarding business conditions.  The shareholder side contends that 
the prevailing model fails to provide a platform conducive to aggres-
sive entrepreneurship and instead invites management self-dealing 
and conservative decisionmaking biased toward institutional stability.  
It looks to a shareholder community populated with actors in financial 
markets for corrective inputs.  Unlike the managers, who are con-
flicted and risk averse, the shareholders come to the table with a pure 
financial incentive to maximize value.  It is a high-stakes debate.  For 
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, along with many other 
proponents of shareholder empowerment, the nation’s global com-
petitive fitness hangs in the balance. 
Even so, shareholder proponents have shifted their emphasis in 
the wake of the financial crisis of 2008.4  Although “accountability” 
remains the ultimate goal, we hear fewer references to market control 
as the means to that end, presumably because it resonates equivocally 
in light of recent market failures.  Proponents instead hold out the 
need to restore “trust.”5  We illustrate this approach with the com-
 
4 But see, e.g., Press Release, Council of Institutional Investors, CII Applauds Intro-
duction of Shareholder Bill of Rights Act (May 19, 2009), available at http://www. 
cii.org/UserFiles/file/draft%20press%20release%20schumer%2005-19-09.pdf (quot-
ing CII Chair and CALPers CIO Joseph A. Dear, who stated that the proposed act was 
needed “to promote market discipline and accountability”). 
5 See The Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of Nell Minow, 
Editor, The Corporate Library) (connecting shareholder power with the restoration of 
credibility); Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation 2, 24-27 (Chi. Booth Sch. 
of Bus., Working Paper No. 08-27, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1319648 (connecting trust and accountability, and contending that shareholder nomi-
nations will channel shareholder inputs to long-term value and deter managing to the 
market); Press Release, The Office of Senator Charles Schumer, Schumer, Cantwell An-
nounce “Shareholder Bill of Rights” to Impose Greater Accountability on Corporate 
America (May 19, 2009), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/ 
record.cfm?id=313468 [hereinafter Schumer Press Release] (emphasizing the need to 
restore confidence through greater accountability and shareholder empowerment); cf. 
Roger Lowenstein, A Seat at the Table, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2009, (Magazine), at 11 (ar-
guing that shareholder-nominated board members will cause shareholders to shift 
from a short-term view, in which exit is the primary means of expressing discontent, to 
a long-term view, in which “the less forceful, but more supple ‘voice’” is used effective-
ly).  For a bank chairman’s thoughts on the need to restore trust, see Stephen Green, 
Group Chairman, HSBC Holdings plc, Speech at the British Bankers’ Association Annual 
International Banking Conference:  Restoring Governance and Trust 3 ( June 30, 2009), 
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ments of former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair-
man Arthur Levitt on the meltdown in the financial sector,6 which was 
still in its early phase when he wrote in the summer of 2008.  For Le-
vitt, the subprime collapse, the Bear Stearns implosion, and revela-
tions of poor risk management at large financial firms had “injected a 
dangerously large degree of mistrust into the markets.”7  He believes 
that managers and boards should have raised the alarm, and that en-
hanced shareholder voice, “[w]hile not a panacea, . . . would go a long 
way in helping to restore trust.”8 
The trust characterization resonates because it focuses on man-
agement culpability, and the managers who now have (or recently 
have had) to rely on government largesse do bear primary responsibil-
ity for the decisions that precipitated the financial crisis.  Executive 
pay has become a flashpoint political issue as a result of the culpability 
designation, and the resulting popular picture is not pretty.9  Manag-
ers of financial companies appear as quick-buck artists who used their 
compensation schemes to siphon millions of dollars from companies 
on the brink of collapse.10  Their shareholders, as the primary bearers 
of losses incurred, emerge as victims along with the taxpayers.11 
Blame for managers means sudden political traction for a 
longstanding law-reform agenda put forward by proponents of share-
holder empowerment.  We have already seen “say on pay” mandates 
imposed on TARP recipients, along with substantive constraints on 
 
available at http://www.hsbc.com/1/PA_1_1_S5/content/assets/newsroom/090630_ 
speech_bba.pdf.   
6 See Arthur Levitt, Jr., Op-Ed., How to Boost Shareholder Democracy, WALL ST. J., July 
1, 2008, at A17 (advocating for the repeal of prior SEC decisions in order to increase 
shareholder control and accountability). 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Czar Blocks BofA Chief’s Pay, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 16, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the Treasury Department’s “special master” 
for compensation objected to Bank of America CEO Kenneth D. Lewis’s 2009 com-
pensation, pushing Lewis to agree to forego salary for the year).  
10 Shareholder rights advocates often use this imagery.  See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra 
note 5, at 11 (“[M]anagers cannot be trusted not to (grossly) overpay themselves . . . .”); 
Schumer Press Release, supra note 5 (“[T]he leadership at some of the nation’s most 
renowned companies took too many risks and too much in salary . . . .” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting Senator Schumer)); cf. Zingales, supra note 5, at 23-24 
(noting the image, but arguing against direct regulation of pay).  
11 See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 2 (describing 
legislative findings and noting that a lack of accountability “led to the loss of trillions of 
dollars in shareholder value, losses that have been borne by millions of Americans who 
are shareholders through their pension plans, 401(k) plans, and direct investments”).  
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modes and amounts of compensation.12  Broad “say on pay” mandates 
appear in prominent proposed legislation13 and in the Administra-
tion’s reform agenda.14  There is also a high-profile SEC proposal to 
amend the proxy rules to require inclusion of shareholder board no-
minees in management proxy statements.15 
While this reaction is perfectly understandable, it remains highly 
questionable as a policy matter.  This Article states the contrary case, 
showing that the financial crisis, far from concluding the matter in the 
shareholders’ favor, bolsters the case for the prevailing legal model.  A 
shareholder-based agency model of the corporation sends manage-
ment a simple instruction:  in all circumstances, manage to maximize 
 
12 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§ 111(b)(2)(A), 122 Stat. 3765, 3777, amended by American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, sec. 7001, § 111, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (to be codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 5221) (requiring sellers of troubled assets to have “limits on compensation 
that exclude incentives for senior executive officers of a financial institution to take 
unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution dur-
ing the period that the Secretary holds an equity or debt position in the financial insti-
tution”).  Subsequent Treasury guidelines require that for all TARP recipients execu-
tive base pay be limited to $500,000 and that any incentive pay must be granted in the 
form of restricted stock, although these rules can be waived by shareholders except for 
those companies receiving “exceptional financial recovery assistance.”  Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive Compensa-
tion (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm; see also 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 secs. 7000–7002, §§ 111, 109(a), 123 
Stat. at 516-21 (amending EESA and limiting incentive payments to the CEO and the 
twenty next-highest-paid executives of large TARP recipients to one-half of the execu-
tive’s salary (other than payments required under earlier contracts and restricted stock), 
prohibiting golden parachutes and defined “luxury” expenditures, and mandating “say 
on pay” votes).  The SEC has proposed a rule implementing the “say on pay” mandate.  
See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 32,474 (proposed July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (amending 
proxy rules to help implement EESA requirements).  
13 See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074 § 3 (amending prior acts to 
require that proxies “include a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to ap-
prove the compensation of executives”).  
14 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:  A NEW 
FOUNDATION 29-30 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf (expressing the Department’s intent to support increased trans-
parency in compensation practices and supporting “say on pay” legislation).   
15 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed 
June 18, 2009) (to be codified in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) (proposing to “require 
companies to include shareholder nominees for director in the companies’ proxy ma-
terials” in certain circumstances).  In addition, the New York Stock Exchange has 
amended its rules to eliminate broker discretionary voting for election of directors (for 
companies not registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940).  N.Y. STOCK 
EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 402.08(B)(19) (2009), available at http:// 
nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/sections (follow “Section 4” hyperlink). 
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the market price of the stock.  And that is exactly what managers of 
some critical financial firms did in recent years.  They managed to a 
market that focused on their ability to increase observable earnings 
and, as it turned out, failed to factor in concomitant increases in risk 
that went largely unobserved. 
Risk taking is at the heart of the capitalist system, but so is the in-
centive-compatible rule that the risk takers internalize not only the 
expected higher returns but also the expected higher systematic risk.  
For the financial institutions judged too big to fail, and apparently for 
others as well, risk internalization has not proven to be the case.  The 
economic rescue’s net costs amount to an externalization of the risks 
taken and an uninvited external shock to the political economy. 
A negative implication follows for shareholder empowerment.  If 
managers misunderstood the quantum of risks they were taking, then 
shareholders with more limited access to the relevant information cer-
tainly were no better informed and accordingly had no role to play in 
preventing externalization.  Even as managers must shoulder the 
blame for the crisis, current complaints about management irrespon-
sibility can legitimately be restated as complaints about management 
to the market.  At the same time, management’s risk aversion—its 
long-derided willingness to accept reduced risk in exchange for insti-
tutional stability—all of a sudden holds out advantages.  Managers are 
risk averse because they fear losing their jobs in bankruptcy.  Whereas 
bankruptcy is a natural element in the “winds of creative destruc-
tion,”16 those winds blow no good when the losses are externalized to 
the U.S. Treasury. 
The prevailing legal structure of the corporation holds out a ro-
bust framework.  Corporate law has always performed a balancing act 
with management discretion and shareholder power.  The balance, 
however, has always privileged the directors and their appointed man-
agers in business policymaking because they are better informed than 
the shareholders and thus better positioned to take responsibility for 
both monitoring and managing the firm and its externalities.  As be-
tween directors and shareholders, it is the directors who have the best 
access to information and are best able to serve as the monitors of the 
managers, increasing the likelihood of compliance with continuing 
 
16 Cf. William J. Abernathy & Kim B. Clark, Innovation:  Mapping the Winds of Crea-
tive Destruction, 14 RES. POL’Y 3, 6 (1984) (describing Joseph Schumpeter’s theory that 
innovation acts as a force of “creative destruction,” reducing the value of existing com-
petence and inspiring new growth).  
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and emerging regulations.  As between managers and shareholders, 
the managers are the ones who have the day-to-day knowledge of the 
company, its history, policies, opportunities, vulnerabilities, and chal-
lenges.  The managers are likely to have the information and institu-
tional perspective suited to anticipate points of conflict with the out-
side political economy and to formulate a responsive strategy.  As long 
as they remain faithful, they are best suited to maximize the value of 
the corporation and thus the shareholders’ residual claim. 
The case outlined above must confront two responses from pro-
ponents of shareholder empowerment:  First, shareholder incentives 
are correctly aligned and their business-policy preferences accordingly 
superior to those of conflicted managers; therefore, shareholder au-
thority would reduce agency costs and increase the value of the corpo-
ration.  Second, the efficiency of stock prices ameliorates the problem 
of information asymmetry and reliably communicates both the value 
implications of corporate policy to the shareholders and the business 
preferences of the shareholders to the managers.  This Article rebuts 
this depiction of a win-win combination of shareholder power and 
market-sensitive management. 
Part I frames the terms of debate.  We ground our conceptual case 
for the prevailing legal model in Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen’s 
description of the governance of publicly traded corporations.  For 
Fama and Jensen, the prevailing legal model follows from an agency-
cost trade-off.  The model divides the economic rights attached to the 
residual claim both from the power to set corporate policy, which goes 
to the managers, and from the responsibility to monitor the agents 
who execute the policy, which goes to the board.  This separation fol-
lows from a natural allocation of interest, information, and expertise.  
It does so for the purpose of reducing the agency costs that would re-
sult if shareholders that are both dispersed and diversified had the 
power to impose policy inputs.  Agency costs do result, but as an em-
bedded and inevitable result of dispersed ownership. 
Part II looks into the debate’s economic stakes, pushing back 
against the shareholder claim that systemic slack results in enormous 
agency costs that can be reduced only through fundamental law 
reform.  We ground our response in Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling’s seminal theory of agency costs and its projection of a dy-
namic, market-based process of agency-cost reduction.  The share-
holder proponents depict agency costs as a static, ahistorical constant.  
We question this picture from a historical perspective, asserting that 
even though agency costs tied to shareholder disempowerment had a 
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moment of high salience during the 1980s, their importance dimi-
nished in subsequent years.  The diminution followed from a dynamic 
pattern of response to underlying market forces, both inside board-
rooms and outside in the markets.  Inside, management reoriented 
itself and adopted key points from the shareholder agenda into cor-
porate business plans, facilitating mergers and restructurings and 
stepping up cash payouts to shareholders.  Outside, shareholders got 
stronger.  The rationally apathetic investor waned as the institutional 
shareholder voice rose in volume and increasingly independent 
boards of directors got into the habit of listening.  In our view, the 
shareholder case emerges denuded of urgency. 
Part III steps into the brave new world projected by the share-
holder proponents, to see how things will work.  We draw on financial 
economic theory to identify serious problems under the new regime.  
The claim of market price robustness rests on the assertion that recent 
advances in the stock market’s informational efficiency render fluid, 
unaffiliated groups of shareholders well enough informed to make wise 
choices on many corporate matters.  Unfortunately, the stock price has 
two material shortcomings when viewed as a source of day-to-day in-
structions for business policy:  First, stock prices are not fully informed 
because of informational asymmetries enjoyed by managers.  Second, 
stock prices can be influenced by speculative factors unrelated to fun-
damental value, factors highlighted in the recent finance literature on 
heterogeneous expectations.  Serious risks of unintended negative con-
sequences follow when management decisions are directed to stock 
price reactions.  It has long been known that financial markets display 
more volatility than the volatility in the underlying economy could ever 
justify.  Asking managers to manage to the market could inject that 
higher degree of financial market volatility into the real economy. 
Part IV turns to the financial crisis.  The fact that management 
bears primary responsibility for the crisis does not by itself effect a pol-
icy connection between increased shareholder power and regulatory 
reform.  A connection obtains only if increased shareholder power 
would have imported more effective risk management in advance of 
the crisis.  No plausible grounds exist for making such a case.  If any-
thing, the managers responsible had incentives too closely aligned 
with those of their shareholders due to equity incentive compensa-
tion.  Compensation, accordingly, is the topic on which the crisis 
holds out a lesson for corporate governance.  If trust is to be restored, 
equity incentive plans must be restructured to discourage manage-
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ment to the market.  Shareholder empowerment, far from getting us 
to that result, would get in the way. 
I.  FRAMING THE ISSUES:  THE PREVAILING LEGAL MODEL,  
SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT, AND AGENCY COSTS 
The prevailing legal model of the corporation privileges the deci-
sionmaking authority of the board of directors.  The board, in the 
classic expression, wields “original and undelegated”17 powers that fol-
low directly from the organizational form provided by the law rather 
than from a delegation of authority from the shareholders.  Even 
though the shareholders elect the board, they have no right to tell it 
what to do.  They can only proceed indirectly, by removing it18 or re-
placing it at the next annual meeting.  As a legal matter, directors are 
not agents of the shareholders. 
Proponents of shareholder empowerment propose an alternative 
regime of shareholder choice regarding matters of business policy.  
Under their contrasting model of the corporation, the shareholders 
emerge as principals in an agency relationship.19  From this point of 
view, the board’s decisionmaking power stems from the shareholders’ 
delegation of that power.  It follows that what the shareholders dele-
gate they should also be able to withdraw. 
This Article makes a policy case to support the present legal allo-
cation of power.  This Part lays out the basic terms of the debate in 
which we intervene.  We begin, in Section A, by contrasting the eco-
nomic framework in which we ground our case with the economic 
framework that undergirds the case for shareholder empowerment.  
Section B lays out shareholder proponents’ law-reform agenda. 
A.  The Economic Stakes:  Trade-Off Versus Win-Win 
The shareholder case has historical roots in The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.20  Berle and 
 
17 People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Hoyt v. Thompson’s Ex’rs, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859)). 
18 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2001) (providing for removal of the boards 
of directors of Delaware corporations). 
19 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-40 (2001) (asserting that legal regimes worldwide have con-
verged on corporate law systems characterized by “shared ownership by investors” and 
“delegated management” to a board). 
20 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1982) (1932). 
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Means famously showed that ownership and control of public corpo-
rations had separated, charging that resultant management power 
needed significant substantive constraint, constraint that earlier in his-
tory had been exercised by shareholder-owners.21 
We base our case for the prevailing legal model on Eugene Fama 
and Michael Jensen’s rebuttal of the Berle and Means diagnosis.22  
Fama and Jensen reframed the separation of ownership and control as 
a rational allocation of risk-bearing and decisionmaking functions.  
Expertise, access to information, and complexity emerge as neutral, 
economic explanations for what Berle and Means described in eco-
nomic terms as intrinsically problematic and in political terms as ille-
gitimate management empowerment. 
1.  The Trade-Off 
Fama and Jensen substitute contract for property as the mode of 
analysis and ask why public corporations have survived in history.  
They suggest that organizational contracts must perform two func-
tions:  (1) the allocation of the residual claim, and (2) the allocation 
of decision rights.23 
In Fama and Jensen’s depiction, shareholders contract for the 
right to the net cash flows, thus taking the residual claim.  Decision 
management and decision control, in contrast, go inside the organiza-
tion, subject to shareholder retention of the right to vote for the 
board and matters reserved for their ratification.24  This holds out an 
 
21 See id. at 124 (“The concentration of economic power separate from ownership 
has, in fact, created economic empires, and has delivered these empires into the hands 
of a new form of absolutism, relegating ‘owners’ to the position of those who supply 
the means whereby the new princes may exercise their power.”). 
22 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 301, 301-02 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Separation] (rebutting 
Berle and Means’s analysis by arguing that organizations where ownership and control 
are separated survive because they benefit from specialization of these roles and are 
able to control agency problems by separating “the ratification and monitoring of deci-
sions from initiation and implementation of the decisions”); see also Eugene F. Fama & 
Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 331-32 
(1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems] (recapping the thesis of Fama & 
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, supra, and noting that devices for separating 
these roles include “decision hierarchies,” boards of directors, and “incentive struc-
tures that encourage mutual monitoring among decision agents”). 
23 Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 22, at 302.  Note that this two-part division 
of functions precisely identifies the two contested zones in corporate law’s political 
economy. 
24 See id. at 313 (explaining that shareholders vote on “auditor choice, mergers, 
and new stock issues” in addition to board membership). 
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economic advantage:  the residual risk holders “are not required to 
have any other role in the organization.”25  This frees them to special-
ize in risk bearing, leaving others to specialize in initiating and im-
plementing business decisions and in monitoring their effectiveness.26  
The alternative of cutting the shareholders into business decisionmak-
ing could be costly:  “[M]ost of the diffuse residual claimants are not 
qualified for roles in the decision process.”27  After all, wealth and wil-
lingness to bear risk do not by themselves assure needed skills.28  It fol-
lows that the delegation of decision management and control to ac-
tors inside the corporation is efficient.29 
Decision rights, thus sent inside the organization, are split be-
tween two groups.  The powers of initiation and implementation go to 
management.30  Thus management is separated from residual risk 
bearing.  The reason is agency-cost reduction.  Given a complex busi-
ness organization with knowledge diffusion, business decisionmaking 
should go to agents with relevant knowledge.31  At the same time, con-
trols need to be imposed to protect the residual claimants from ex-
propriation by the managers.  This second aspect of agency-cost re-
duction calls for having a separate decision controller to monitor and 
ratify management decisions.32  The two decision functions, manage-
ment and monitoring, must be separate “almost by definition.”33  As a 
result, a board of directors that includes outsiders performs the moni-
toring function.34  The board retains “ultimate control over internal 
agents” and their decisions35 and stands in for the classical owner-
entrepreneur36 of Berle and Means.  Backstopping the board as agen-
 
25 Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems, supra note 22, at 328. 
26 Id. at 330.  
27 Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 22, at 309. 
28 See id. at 312 (commenting that, because managerial skills are not necessarily 
tied to wealth or willingness to bear risk, specialization enhances a complex organiza-
tion’s ability to adapt to changes in the economic environment and lowers the cost of 
risk-bearing services). 
29 Id. at 309. 
30 See id. at 303-04 (defining the activities involved in decision initiation and im-
plementation). 
31 See id. at 307-08 (noting that this model reduces agency costs). 
32 Id. at 308-09. 
33 Id. at 304. 
34 See id. at 313, 315 (discussing the incentives of outside directors). 
35 Id. at 313.  
36 See id. at 309 (“Separation and diffusion of decision management and decision 
control—in effect, the absence of a classical entrepreneurial decision maker—limit the 
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cy-cost controllers are a host of public and private external monitors—
the courts and regulatory agencies on the public side, and the stock 
market and the takeover market on the private side.37 
What becomes of ownership in Fama and Jensen’s contractual 
model?  The model, rather than separating it from control, divides it 
up along with control.  The classical owner-entrepreneur performs all 
three of the functions they identify—-she sets business policy, moni-
tors corporate agents, and bears the residual risk.  Fama and Jensen in 
effect take these ownership incidents and distribute them across the 
organization.  The shareholders emerge as owners-in-part, bearing the 
residual risk and, as voters, sharing in control at a step removed from 
business decisionmaking and direct monitoring.  It follows that man-
agement and the board share in ownership.  This sharing of owner-
ship functions implies nothing radical; it is just a contractual adjust-
ment of the classical model that accounts for the evolution of 
corporate law and practice during the twentieth century. 
Thus Fama and Jensen rebut the notion that corporate gover-
nance is dysfunctional because a traditional shareholder-owner is ab-
sent.  But the rebuttal, effective though it may be, does not by itself 
determine the outcome of today’s contest between the shareholder-
directed agency model and the prevailing legal model.  It does, how-
ever, clear noise from the screen, facilitating a meaningful statement 
of the policy issue.  The noise comes from the conceptual legacy of 
unitary ownership and the teaching that shareholders are owners who 
are natural principals in an agency relationship with corporate man-
agement.  Once the noise is filtered out and the division of ownership 
is recognized, the question becomes whether the allocation of author-
ity in public corporations makes economic sense.  Fama and Jensen 
answer in the affirmative for the reasons just given. 
2.  The Win-Win 
The shareholders’ basic claims can be accessed through Henry 
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s identification of two touchstone 
points that ground a general consensus in their favor:  first, “ultimate 
control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder[s],” and 
 
power of individual decision agents to expropriate the interests of residual clai-
mants.”). 
37 Id. at 312-13. 
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second, the market price of the corporation’s stock should provide 
“the principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.”38 
“Ultimate control” takes us to an agency framework39 favoring 
shareholder inputs.  The supporting economic case focuses on agency 
costs and incentives.  All other things equal, agency-cost reduction 
enhances value, and enhanced principal control can conceivably low-
er agency costs.40  So the question is whether shareholders, as princip-
als, are well suited to provide value-enhancing inputs, or, as Fama and 
Jensen asserted, are not well suited. 
The suitability case begins with shareholder incentives:  their capi-
tal investment41 in the residual interest lends them an undiluted, pure 
financial incentive to maximize the value of the firm.42  From an in-
centive point of view, shareholders contrast favorably with managers 
and independent directors, whose incentives are comprised by inter-
ests in compensation and job retention. 
The question then becomes whether these pure shareholder in-
centives can be harnessed by the governance system despite the fact 
that dispersed, diversified shareholders labor under information 
asymmetries and lack business expertise.  Hansmann and Kraakman’s 
second proposition—that the market price of the stock provides the 
“principal measure” of the shareholder interest—holds out the means 
to this end.  If the stock price provides an objective and accurate 
 
38 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 440-41. 
39 The phrase “ultimate control” is imprecise.  The assertion in the text reflects 
our interpretation.  The legal model already vests the franchise in the shareholders 
and directs the board to manage in their interests.  Arguably, this amounts to an allo-
cation of “ultimate control.”  Hansmann and Kraakman accordingly imply more in the 
way of shareholder authority.  To see why, compare Hansmann and Kraakman’s con-
ception to that of Fama and Jensen, who assign “ultimate control” to the board of di-
rectors, subject to the shareholder vote.  See Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 22, 
at 313.  This would not suffice for Hansmann and Kraakman, for whom “ultimate con-
trol” at a minimum means shareholder choice on tender offers, as they consider trust-
based outcomes favoring management discretion to be inefficient.  See Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 19, at 467.  Even as today’s shareholder agenda goes much 
farther, the term “ultimate control” easily accommodates it. 
40 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 1, at 16 (asserting that 
“[s]hareholder rights serve the critical function of reducing . . . agency costs” and that 
inadequate shareholder rights cause shares to trade at a discount to fundamental value). 
41 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activi-
ty in the United States:  Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, 
at 121, 138 (“[I]f resources are to shift . . . the market may have a role to play in funne-
ling capital toward the new companies.”). 
42 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 449 (“[I]f the control rights 
granted to the firm’s equity-holders are exclusive and strong, they will have powerful 
incentives to maximize the value of the firm.”). 
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measure of the purely motivated shareholder directive to maximize 
value, it provides the best source of instructions for governance and 
business policy.  After all, it is in the financial market where share-
holders, using the Holmstrom and Kaplan metaphor, “put their mon-
ey where their mouth is.”43  From this it follows that a manager-agent 
with correct incentives should manage to the market price.44 
Thus do the shareholder proponents contemplate a species of 
market control.45  They want the market price—which is, after all, set 
by shareholders investing at the margin—to be the ongoing and de-
termining source of shareholder input.  It bids those managers who 
are effective agents to manage to the stock market in formulating 
business policy, thereby accessing the high-quality instructions embed-
ded in stock market prices.  With the market price as the management 
yardstick, value-enhancing opportunities to merge, sell, or dissolve will 
no longer be frustrated by the managers’ desire to hold on to control; 
resources will no longer be misdirected to suboptimal executive com-
pensation plans; and governance arrangements will import appropri-
ate constraints and incentives.46  Managing to the market price also is 
thought to import administrative coherence, because the yardstick 
provides a means with which to evaluate management performance.47 
Value maximization pursued with a long-term time horizon is said 
to follow.48  Here the proponents refer to basic principles of valuation, 
 
43 Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 41, at 138; see also George W. Dent, Jr., Academ-
ics in Wonderland:  The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Gover-
nance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1225 (2008) (“Although share prices do not exactly 
match fundamental value, no measure is better.”).  
44 This Article continues a line of analysis that begins in Michael L. Wachter, Take-
over Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787 
(2003). 
45 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 1, at 16 (asserting that 
strengthened “shareholder rights go hand in hand with reduced regulation [and] liti-
gation”). 
46 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 840, 850 (2005) (noting that, in the absence of shareholder intervention, 
management tends not to adopt “game-ending decisions” because such decisions also 
end the managers’ control). 
47 See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 41, at 138-39 (explaining that long-term 
management effects, especially in times of change, are difficult to measure absent 
share prices). 
48 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 451 (“The ability of standard-
model firms to expand rapidly in growth industries is magnified . . . by access to 
institutional investors and the international equity markets . . . . Over time, then, the 
standard model is likely to win the competitive struggle on the margins . . . . As the 
pace of technological change continues to quicken, this competitive advantage should 
continue to increase.”). 
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which teach that long-term value is impounded in the present market 
price.49  It follows that managing to the market price is incentive com-
patible with regard to the time horizon because both short-term and 
long-term investors have incentives to maximize long-term value.50 
Shareholder proponents do not deny that the market price is set 
under conditions of information asymmetry and thus is not fully in-
formed.51  The implied assertion is that any resulting divergence be-
tween market price and fundamental value will not hold out perverse 
effects, given management to the market price.  An ameliorating factor 
has also been noted:  some studies show that market prices have be-
come better informed over the past half century.52  The information 
gap between those inside and outside of the corporation has narrowed, 
due in part to stricter mandatory disclosure requirements and in part to 
more liquid markets and a larger sector of information intermediaries.53 
Summing up, shareholder proponents seek to reform the prevail-
ing legal model of the corporation (or what might be called the “Fa-
ma-Jensen corporation”) to ensure that shareholder inputs directly 
impact both business decisionmaking and monitoring.  The support-
ing theoretical case rests upon three assumptions:  first, that informa-
tion asymmetries can be ignored (or alternatively, that managers can-
not be trusted to use their superior knowledge in the best interest of 
the corporation); second, that business instructions following from 
pure financial incentives have agency-cost reductive effects; and, third, 
that the market price accurately communicates these instructions. 
 
49 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law:  The Uncertain 
Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 522 (2002) (explaining that intrinsic or 
“hidden” value can be assessed by a board but is invisible to shareholders). 
50 In the view of shareholder proponents, accountability suffers under the prevailing 
regime, leading to inefficient regulatory responses, including shareholder litigation.  See 
COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 1, at 16, 93-96.  Therefore, systemic 
reform designed to facilitate shareholder intervention is appropriate because the inhe-
rited model affords management discretionary space to disregard the price directive. 
51 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005:  Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1548-63 (2007) 
(discussing the factors that have narrowed the scope of information asymmetry and 
thereby increased stock price information, but not suggesting perfect symmetry).  
52 For a description of the empirical literature, which focuses on an increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility, see infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. 
53 See Gordon, supra note 51, at 1548-63 (attributing stock prices’ increased infor-
mation value to SEC and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) disclosure 
regulations, as well as to the rise in investment analysts and information-dissemination 
mechanisms).  
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B.  The Law-Reform Agenda 
The shareholders’ law-reform agenda took shape in response to 
the takeover wars of the 1980s.  State lawmakers and state courts, in 
particular the Delaware courts, responded to the outbreak of hostile 
activity by restating and reinforcing the legal model’s allocation of au-
thority to management.54  The shareholder case coalesced as a protest 
against that outcome, and the context was ideally suited to the share-
holder position.  Recall that Fama and Jensen defended the legal 
model on the assumption that a vigorous market for corporate control 
operated as a check on subpar managers.55  If courts and legislatures 
had impaired that market’s operation, the impairments needed to be 
removed.  Moreover, the takeover context minimized the importance 
of the shareholders’ debilities respecting information and expertise.  
In the information-enriched environment created by the disclosure 
requirements of a contested battle for control, shareholders were 
deemed informed enough to choose rationally between the value of 
two or more competing corporate strategies.56 
Furthermore, shareholders were seen as having been on the right 
side of the era’s valuation questions.  The capital markets emerged 
 
54 This response raised questions about the terms of fiduciary duty.  It took a dec-
ade and four famous cases before the Delaware courts delivered a definitive answer res-
pecting the scope of the fiduciary duty.  See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1388 (Del. 1995) (ruling that refusal to redeem a poison pill survives review if it is 
neither “preclusive” nor “coercive” and falls within a “range of reasonableness”); Para-
mount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) (sustaining the 
“just say no” defense based on a business plan implemented by the board of directors); 
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351-57 (Del. 1985) (sustaining the poi-
son pill as a structural matter and applying Unocal scrutiny); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe-
troleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985) (applying proportionality scrutiny to 
management defense tactics).  When the answer finally came, trust trumped agency, 
forcing hostile offerors to resort to the shareholder franchise in the form of a proxy 
fight for board control in order to put to the shareholders the choice between the offer 
price and management’s claim that its business plan held out greater value on a long-
term basis.  That is, the board was left with the power to block offers to protect the busi-
ness plan, thereby remitting the exercise of shareholder choice not to the market for 
shares but to the exercise of the franchise.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Sales 
and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corporate Control, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
783, 788 (2001) (emphasizing that, because of the ubiquity of the poison pill, corporate 
control changes occur principally by election rather than through the market). 
55 See supra text accompanying notes 30-37. 
56 The Delaware courts disagreed even so, channeling the contested control transac-
tion into the even richer information environment of the proxy contest.  See Paramount 
Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1154-55 (permitting a corporation’s board of directors to forgo 
unsolicited tender offers it perceives as threats to corporate policy despite shareholder 
support, thereby forcing a bidder to use alternative means of acquiring control). 
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from the 1980s with an enhanced reputation as drivers of productivity.  
The era’s corporate restructurings were deemed to have been a pro-
ductive success.  It followed that capital markets had a comparative 
advantage over appointed managers in effecting structural reforms 
necessitated by deregulation and technological change.57  Firms tend 
to be experts in existing technologies, products, and processes.  Mar-
kets came to be thought to have the advantage when it comes to re-
cognizing the implications of new technologies, products, and 
processes—the markets move the capital to higher-valuing users who 
then put the capital into more productive projects.58 
Shareholder empowerment emerged from the takeover era as the 
leading issue in corporate law, with a consistent consensus in its favor.  
The list of agenda items continued to grow during the period of insti-
tutional adjustment that followed.  The shareholders, dissatisfied with 
the legal outcome and led by now-dominant institutions, lost their pas-
sivity.59  “Governance” became a zone of ongoing engagement between 
managers, institutional shareholders, and a new class of professional 
intermediaries.  Independent boards of directors assumed greater in-
stitutional salience.60 
Even so, shareholder empowerment remained elusive61 and so 
emerged as the focus of a law-reform agenda.  If the shareholders could 
 
57 See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 41, at 122 (“The real drivers behind the 
increased dominance of capital markets . . . can be traced to deregulation . . . and to 
new information and communication technologies . . . .”).  We note that while 
Holmstrom and Kaplan expect the 1980s experience of market advantage to persist 
over time, they also acknowledge the possibility of changed conditions under which 
market price guidance could lose its productive quality.  See id. at 140-41 (suggesting 
that if stock markets slow, reliance on them may also decrease). 
58 See id. at 137-38 (“Markets are more effective than managers when it comes to 
moving capital from declining industries to emerging industries.”); cf. Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 19, at 450-51 (noting that shareholder input will favor aggressive 
development of new product markets and abandonment of inefficient investments). 
59 Shareholders can be counted on to vote against antitakeover amendments and in 
favor of redeeming poison pills.  See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Pill:  Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 898 
(2002) (noting that, when possible, shareholders prevented the adoption of “takeover-
inhibiting charter amendments” while voting in favor of proposals to redeem poison pills). 
60 See Gordon, supra note 51, at 1511 (noting the “increasingly tight link between 
the independent board and the priority of shareholder value”). 
61 The post-takeover era began with a vision of direct institutional investor control 
through aggressive use of the shareholder franchise.  See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder 
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 525, 585-89 (1990) (discussing shareholder 
monitoring as a concept that had not yet come to fruition and analyzing factors that 
influence whether shareholders remain apathetic or not).  It was hoped that institu-
tional holdings had reached a level of concentration that would render collective ac-
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not surmount collective action problems themselves, then law reform 
directed at lowering the costs and expanding the payoffs of shareholder 
intervention made sense.  Today’s shareholder law-reform agenda 
serves these dual purposes. 
Proposals on the agenda fall into two categories.  The first, a nar-
rower category, accepts the existing legal model in its broad outline 
and focuses on process reforms designed to expand the range of 
shareholder choices in the election process and to facilitate share-
holder contests.  The second type would give the shareholders the op-
tion to legislate their way out of the prevailing model, to an agency 
model holding out direct control of business policy.  Cost concerns 
are present in both categories.  Some reforms are designed to en-
hance the impact of existing low-cost activist strategies like “just vote 
no” campaigns.  All of the rest include transfers from the corporate 
treasury to intervening shareholders. 
The list of improvements proposed for the present election system 
is lengthy.  The first items are designed to facilitate rejection of se-
lected candidates and protest voting.  These include majority (as op-
posed to plurality) voting and confidential voting, both of which have 
already been adopted voluntarily by many corporations.62  Reformers 
 
tion barriers surmountable, with U.S. institutions stepping into the role played by 
blockholders in other governance systems.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraak-
man, Reinventing the Outside Director:  An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 863, 884-88 (1991) (suggesting that institutional investors could organize on a 
subscription basis and fund correctly incentivized candidates for board seats).  But no 
such movement to self-help by spontaneous order occurred.  Far from yielding, collec-
tive action barriers instead emerged much reinforced in the new environment.  The 
free-rider problem continued to discourage investment managers from incurring the 
costs of governance challenges—gains that must be shared with competitors who do 
not share the costs do not advance investment managers’ careers.  See Jill E. Fisch, Rela-
tionship Investing:  Will It Happen?  Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009, 1019-25 (1994) 
(discussing the free-rider problem as disincentivizing investors from monitoring be-
cause the benefits spread to competitive investors but the cost is only borne by the 
monitor); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder 
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 473-74 (1991) (acknowledging that money managers have no 
selective incentives to actively improve diversified funds because doing so would simulta-
neously benefit the managers to whom they are compared).   
 At the same time, many fund advisors sell services to managers, importing an inde-
pendent business reason to stay cooperative.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751-54 (2006) (describ-
ing the incentive problems of financial institutions).  Finally, mutual fund investors can 
redeem at any time, inhibiting investment in large, illiquid blockholder positions that 
would carry boardroom influence. 
62 See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS, at viii 
(2007), http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy111207.pdf (demonstrating 
that majority voting has become standard practice among large public companies). 
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want shareholders to have the option of a “no” vote (as opposed to the 
present “withhold” vote expression of negativity) and a right to re-
place all incumbents every two or three years.63  Other provisions hold 
out more in the way of power shifting.  They would clear a way for 
shareholder nomination of board candidates, not only by opening 
access to the proxy statement but by providing for reimbursement of 
solicitation expenses.64 
The second legislative category is more radical.  The shareholders 
already have the power to amend the bylaws under state codes.65  But, 
even cabined in a tight zone of process-based subject matter,66 the power 
has been unexercised because shareholders, while they do have the pow-
er to put a bylaw amendment to a shareholders’ meeting, have neither 
access to management’s proxy statement nor state law power to trump 
contrary board-adopted bylaws.  The reformers would grant both.67 
At the same time, there are definite limits on what can be accom-
plished through bylaw amendment.  Bylaws are limited to process 
matters and cannot surmount the reservation to the board of the 
power to manage the business, a reservation read broadly by the De-
laware courts.68  Only a charter amendment can delimit the board’s 
powers,69 and state corporate codes accord the board agenda control 
 
63 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
700-04 (2007) (suggesting these election reforms as part of a broader reform scheme 
to make directors accountable to shareholders). 
64 See id. at 696-700 (noting that threshold requirements would be needed).  For 
the SEC’s recent proposal, see Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.), 
and supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
65 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2001) (granting shareholders the power 
to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws even when directors share this power). 
66 See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231-40 (Del. 
2008) (answering questions certified from the SEC regarding a proposed bylaw that 
improperly sought to “remove the subject of election expense reimbursement” from 
the board’s discretion). 
67 See Bebchuk, supra note 63, at 707-11 (arguing that shareholder-adopted bylaws 
should be facilitated while boards’ power to adopt bylaws should be constrained).  The 
SEC’s current proposed rules include a limited bylaw access provision, keyed to 
“shareholder proposals that would amend, or that request an amendment to, a com-
pany’s governing documents regarding nomination procedures or disclosures related 
to shareholder nominations . . . .”  Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 
Fed. Reg. at 29,024. 
68 See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 232 (noting that shareholders lack the broad manage-
ment power statutorily allocated to the board of directors). 
69 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(2) (“[A] corporation may amend its certifi-
cate of incorporation . . . [t]o change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of its 
business or corporate powers and purposes . . . .”). 
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over charter amendments.70  The agency reformers accordingly would 
open the door to shareholder-initiated charter amendments and ac-
cord power to initiate a change of jurisdiction of incorporation, with 
expense reimbursement.71  They contemplate that once the door is 
opened, shareholders can allocate to themselves the power to force a 
sale or liquidation of the firm,72 or to force a large dividend (and the 
leveraged financing thereof) or a subsidiary spin-off.73  Present pro-
posals respecting business policy stop at this point.  But we note an 
implicit open end:  once any door to the reversal of board business 
judgment is opened, there will be no principled basis for containing 
shareholder mandates respecting business policy. 
Finally, “say on pay” initiatives would similarly allow the share-
holders to cross the line to control of business policy, but in ratifica-
tion mode and on a mandated annual basis.  Here the idea is to put 
the top executives’ total compensation package to the shareholders 
for an up/down advisory vote.74 
C.  Summary 
The shareholders’ reform agenda reflects their view that the pre-
vailing model is out of date.  By hypothesis, it remained defensible on-
ly so long as collective action problems rendered shareholder exercise 
of discretionary powers infeasible.  But, as we have seen, concentrated 
institutional shareholdings have not by themselves removed this bar-
rier.  Accordingly, if the firm is to be reconstituted along agency 
lines,75 the shareholder collective action problem must first be solved 
by changing the terms of shareholding itself through a system of sub-
sidies for activists.  With that accomplished, the shareholders would get 
the power to opt out of the prevailing model on a firm-by-firm basis. 
 
70 See id. § 242(b)(1) (“Every amendment authorized by subsection (a) . . . shall be 
made . . . in the following manner: . . . [the] board of directors shall adopt a resolution 
setting forth the amendment proposed . . . .”).  
71 See Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 865-70 (suggesting that shareholders should be 
empowered to change things like the corporate charter and the state of incorporation). 
72 See id. at 895-901 (addressing the effects on agency costs of shareholder power 
to participate in “game-ending” decisions). 
73 See id. at 901-08 (analyzing the impact of shareholder power to make “scaling-
down” decisions). 
74 Initiatives presently on Washington reform agendas fall into the first, narrower cat-
egory addressed to the shareholder franchise.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
75 See Black, supra note 61, at 608 (noting that shareholder voice is an idea that has 
never been tried, rather than an idea that has failed). 
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Significantly, the shareholder proponents do not anticipate that 
these reforms would open the door to hundreds of issue-based proxy 
contests.  They instead point to an in terrorem effect.  They project 
that the threat of shareholder intervention by itself will influence man-
agement conduct, forcing managers to focus on the stock price in or-
der to avoid triggering destabilizing and disempowering shareholder 
action.76 
The projection is fair.77  But therein lies the problem.  The share-
holder proponents dismiss the prevailing legal model too quickly, 
 
76 See Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 878 (“Introducing the [shareholder] power to 
intervene would induce management to act differently in order to avoid shareholder 
intervention.”). 
77 In making this projection, shareholder proponents effectively respond to a 
point made by their critics, who warn that pure financial incentives posited by share-
holder proponents will not obtain efficiency in all cases and that empowered activists 
may have private agendas.  See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Share-
holder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 586-93 (2006) (explaining how the interests of cer-
tain types of shareholders may differ from the interests of others).  Since the bite lies 
in the threat, any problems of self-dealing can be dealt with by fiduciary law, and any 
incentive misalignments in actual contests will come out and impact the vote.  Note 
also that if the bite lies in the threat, any shareholder incentive problems will be mi-
nimal because the shareholders who actually wield the power will be the market price 
setters, actors who do indeed act with undiluted incentives to maximize value. 
 The critics make two additional points.  First, they project governance incohe-
rence in the move from oligarchic to democratic governance, citing information 
asymmetries and conflicting interests within the group of newly empowered constitu-
ents.  See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 61, at 1745 (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIM-
ITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 (1974)) (arguing that authority-based decisionmaking 
structures, grounded in central agencies empowered to make binding decisions, are 
necessary when the organization’s constituencies suffer from information asymmetries 
and have differing interests).  Second, they predict that shareholder empowerment will 
impose a short-term time horizon with consequent perverse effects.  See, e.g., Anabtawi, 
supra, at 579-80 (noting how pressure from short-term shareholders can cause compa-
nies to neglect long-term focus).  
 Shareholder proponents similarly rely on the market price to rebut the first criti-
cism.  They pose the market price as the focal point for decisionmaking, thereby ob-
viating any coherence problem.  If the market price is indeed suited to guide business 
policymaking, the shareholder proponents win this point.  Emphasis accordingly needs 
to be directed away from theories of government to financial economics, where the 
inquiry should focus on the interplay between information asymmetry, investor expec-
tations, and market pricing.  We conduct this inquiry in Part III.  This analysis also ap-
plies to the short-term time-horizon objection.  Under basic principles of valuation, 
short-term and long-term investors both have incentives to maximize long-term value, 
and the market price subsumes all time horizons—short, intermediate, and long.  See 
Black & Kraakman, supra note 49, at 532-33 (asserting that “even short-term investors 
have an incentive to maximize the firm’s long-term value, because only by doing so can 
they maximize the price at which long-term investors will buy the shares that the short-
term investors will soon want to sell”).  If the market price does so accurately, then 
there should be no perverse effects.   
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eliding two critical points.  The first of these is taken up in Part II.  
There we show that in the years since the takeover era, the legal mod-
el has proven highly responsive to shareholder interests and demands, 
ameliorating agency costs.  The second point is addressed in Part III.  
The shareholders, even as they plausibly expect that an agency model 
would further reduce agency costs, fail to confront new costs that 
would result from the change, in particular suboptimal results stem-
ming from managing to the market.  In our view, once these counter-
vailing points are on the table, the shareholder empowerment case 
falls well short of surmounting the burden of proof that ordinarily 
confronts proposals for fundamental structural change. 
II.  SYSTEMIC RESPONSIVENESS 
We have seen that the shareholder proponents’ win-win scenario 
predicts that shareholder empowerment will cause agency costs to de-
cline and capital to flow to the best use, and that agency costs will 
persist absent shareholder empowerment.  Agency-cost reduction and 
shareholder empowerment move in lockstep in this picture—you do 
not get one without the other.  This sine qua non posits constant, 
highly salient agency costs and claims that fundamental law reform is 
the only way to reduce them.  This in turn implies that the corporate 
governance system leaves big money on the table in the ordinary 
course, a proposition that to us is counterintuitive. 
This Part challenges the shareholder sine qua non.  Our challenge 
follows from the lesson Jensen and Meckling taught in their classic 
work on agency costs:  institutions change in response to market in-
centives.  In Jensen and Meckling’s framework, managers and share-
holders address agency costs as they arise over time, in the managers’ 
case by bonding their fidelity and in the shareholders’ case by moni-
toring their investments.78  To the extent agency costs remain unad-
dressed, it is because they are too costly for the parties to remove 
themselves.79  Agency-cost reduction, then, is as much an endogenous 
incident of the system’s operation as are agency costs themselves.  A 
prediction results for corporate governance:  as new agency costs ap-
 
 Thus, the shareholder proponents rely entirely on the robustness of the market 
price of the stock as a predictor of fundamental value.   
78 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
79 See id. (explaining how many agency costs can be avoided through principal 
monitoring and agent bonding expenditures, and referring to the remaining agency 
costs as the “residual loss”). 
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pear, we can expect the system to find ways to reduce them, even as a 
residual component of agency costs will persist in the wake of the sys-
tem’s adjustments. 
The shareholder sine qua non, in contrast, follows from a static 
picture of agency costs and corporate governance institutions.  This 
holds that managers will systematically fail to maximize value in pre-
dictable ways.  They will favor conservative, low-leverage capital struc-
tures, misinve st excess cash in suboptimal projects, fail to reduce 
excess operating costs, and resist premium sales of control.  All of 
these missed opportunities amount to agency costs that could be re-
duced if the law provided for greater shareholder input. 
This fixed picture of systemic shortcomings derives less from eco-
nomic theory than from a particular time and governance context.  
The time was the 1980s, and the context was the debate over hostile 
takeovers.  At the time, the management predilection for institutional 
stability had significant negative implications for productivity, with an 
open playing field for hostile bids as the agency-cost corrective of 
choice.80  This Part uses Jensen and Meckling’s framework as a lens for 
reviewing subsequent history, contending that the corporate gover-
nance system has been dynamic rather than static in addressing agen-
cy costs.  Indeed, developments on the front lines of business practice 
have led to a series of agency-cost-reductive changes.  We use four crit-
ical examples to indicate that recent history bears out the Jensen-
Meckling prediction of responsive agency-cost reduction both by ac-
tors inside corporations and actors in the financial markets.  First, 
managers emerged from the 1980s sensitized to the benefits of share-
holder-value maximization even as the board of directors emerged as 
a more robust monitoring institution.  Hostile takeovers lost their 
place at the cutting edge of corporate governance as a result.  Second, 
the revival of private equity buyouts showed that disciplinary merger 
activity can proliferate even in the absence of either actual or threat-
ened hostile bids.  Third, the appearance of hedge fund activists 
showed, much to the surprise of many, that the prevailing legal model 
of the shareholder franchise can be well suited to shareholder inter-
vention.  Finally, a shareholder-directed break in a longstanding pat-
tern of corporate cash payouts accompanied the hedge funds’ ap-
pearance. 
 
80 See, e.g., Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously:  The Implications of “Dis-
counted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 897-901 (1988) 
(offering two hypotheses on the sources of discounted share prices). 
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Cumulated, these developments show that the governance system 
works dynamically within the prevailing legal model to remove money 
on the table stemming from excess agency costs.  Shareholder empo-
werment proponents have played an important role in this process by 
exerting continuing pressure on directors and managers.  They are 
deservedly applauded for their efforts (as are directors and managers 
who weigh in against them in the public debate).  Even so, a question 
arises as to the need for greater shareholder empowerment. 
A.  Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control 
We start with an evolutionary account of the corporate gover-
nance system put forward by Bengt Holmstrom and Steven Kaplan in 
2001.  They surveyed the evolution of shareholder-manager relations, 
noting that a regime of market-oriented corporate governance 
emerged in the wake of the 1980s.  They depicted the takeover wars as 
a reaction to an external shock caused by economic factors such as 
deregulation, globalization, and new information and communica-
tions technologies.  The financial markets, they observed, showed a 
comparative advantage over management in undertaking the struc-
tural adjustments made necessary by the changes.81  Viewed from this 
perspective, the shift to market control followed neither from its in-
trinsic superiority respecting capital allocation nor from a structurally 
embedded level of excess agency costs but from transitory economic 
factors.82  A different economic environment, said Holmstrom and 
Kaplan, could trigger a shift away from the markets.83 
 
81 Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 41, at 122-23. 
82 See id. at 137 (suggesting that “markets have come to play a bigger role not be-
cause they have become better at allocating capital and not because managers misbe-
haved, but rather because the market’s comparative advantage has been favored by 
economy-wide trends in deregulation, globalization, and information technologies”). 
83 In discussing potential future developments, Holmstrom and Kaplan stated, 
We have argued that at least some of the efficiency gains associated with these 
changes can be traced to the comparative advantage of markets in undertak-
ing large-scale change.  Since these effects are temporary, it is possible that the 
current level of market influence on the governance and organization of firms 
is going to abate.  It is not hard to build a scenario in which the pursuit of 
shareholder value becomes a less important guideline to managers in the next 
few years. . . . If the stock markets are flat or down for the next few years, then 
the extensive reliance on stock options may again dissipate, leading managers 
to have less focus on stock prices. 
Id. at 140.  
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For Holmstrom and Kaplan, the takeover shock in turn caused a 
governance response:  shareholder-oriented economic assumptions 
took hold within corporate boardrooms.  Incentive realignment was 
essential in bringing this about, and the move to equity-based man-
agement compensation duly encouraged managers to see things the 
shareholders’ way.  Thus, restructuring found its way into strategic 
business planning in the ordinary course.  Corporate governance prac-
tices changed, too, with the emergence of the independent monitoring 
board.  By all available indicators, the move to board independence 
and more vigorous monitoring continues unabated.84 
Significantly, none of this required any changes in the prevailing 
legal model.  The emergence of the independent board did occasion 
some pushing and shoving in the private sector, manifested in the ges-
tation of the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project.85  
But it can still be fairly described as a joint effort by directors and inves-
tors seeking best corporate practices.  Regulatory mandates came after 
the fact.86  The system, in sum, became more cognizant of the need to 
reduce agency costs, with private ordering as the means to the end.87 
Hostile takeovers decreased in policy salience as the market con-
text changed.  Merger volume reached new records, and the transac-
tions were overwhelmingly friendly.88  Managers proved willing to sell.  
 
84 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs 37-46 (Eur. Corp. Governance 
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 116/2008, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1281516 (surveying the range of pertinent empirical measures of changes in boards of 
directors).  We make the same assertion respecting section 162(m) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, enacted in 1994, which limits the corporate tax deductability of salaries 
to $1 million.  I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006).  Had the governance system not changed its 
views first, we doubt it would have occurred to Congress to add the section. 
85 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1993) (describing conflicting views between the American 
Law Institute and corporate management). 
86 The stock exchange rules mandating committees arrived only after Enron.  
These, for the first time, hard-wire the majority-independent board of directors.  N.Y. 
STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2009), available at http:// 
nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections (follow “Section 3” hyperlink).  Not only is an 
independent director majority now mandated, but independence is formally defined.  
Id. § 303A.02.  Accompanying mandates include separate meetings for outside direc-
tors and for all independent nominating, compensation, and audit committees.  Id. 
§§ 303A.03–.06.   
87 Thus did Hansmann and Kraakman declare an end to corporate law history at 
the new century’s start.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 439 (“There is 
no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally 
strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).  
88 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 59, at 878-80, 879 tbl.2 (detailing trends in M&A 
activity from 1988 to 2000). 
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Stock options and exit compensation provided a carrot, and majority-
independent boards held out a stick in the form of a rising rate of 
CEO dismissals.89  Hostility became less a fundamental transactional 
distinction and more a secondary strategy choice determined by cost-
benefit calculations at the acquiring firm.90  The hostile offer’s dimi-
nishing importance is further confirmed by the diminishing incidence 
of defensive devices in corporate contracts.  Staggered boards (which 
together with poison pills afford the maximum available protection) 
among S&P 100 companies declined from 44% to 16% between 2003 
and 2008; the decline among S&P 500 companies was from 57% in 
2003 to 36% in 2007.91 
Meanwhile, the private equity buyout is the segment of the mer-
gers and acquisitions market most likely to entail the post-closing go-
vernance discipline sought by the shareholder camp, a segment that 
experienced a remarkable revival beginning in the mid-1990s.  Buyout 
firms act as aggressive blockholders, closely monitoring management 
performance and imposing performance targets.92  The private equity 
business model includes and depends on an active threat of manager 
removal even as it includes and depends on the participation of man-
agement incumbents and incentivizes them with a share of the equity.  
Leverage enhances the threat by interpolating the possibility of down-
side disaster and magnifying the financial payoff for success.93  Discip-
line, accordingly, is wrought into these companies’ governance struc-
tures.  Pre-closing hostility, however, is avoided.  When the recent 
buyout boom peaked in 2006, buyouts comprised forty-two percent of 
total merger activity as measured by number of transactions.94 
All of this shows the corporate governance system acting out the 
Jensen and Meckling model.  Managers bonded themselves by playing 
 
89 See id. at 881-84 (describing the effects of having independent board members). 
90 See G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers:  In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55 J. FIN. 
2599, 2600 (2000) (suggesting that “the distinction between hostile and friendly offers 
is largely  a reflection of negotiation strategy”). 
91 Kahan & Rock, supra note 84, at 21-22.  The trend of decline is also evident in 
smaller firms, but the magnitude is less—in 2007, 58% of S&P 400 mid-cap firms and 
55% of S&P 600 small-cap firms had staggered boards.  Id. at 22. 
92 See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity 9 (Eur. Corp. Go-
vernance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 082/2007, 2007), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=982114 (noting that “management will be forced to adhere to strict, 
results-oriented financial projections”).  
93 See id. (observing that “[t]he overall result is a more dynamic and challenging 
boardroom style than prevails in public companies”). 
94 William W. Bratton, Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 9 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 509, 513 fig.1 (2008). 
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ball with the independent board, aligning their personal wealth with 
that of the shareholders and, in a growing number of cases, giving up 
their takeover defenses.  Investors simultaneously stepped up their 
monitoring.  Agency-cost reduction was the end in view on both sides.  
The market power that first registered in the conflicts of the 1980s 
continued to register,95 but in a more cooperative framework.  Share-
holder value creation became embedded in corporate practice under 
the prevailing legal model.  No fundamental, facilitative legal change 
was needed.96 
A shareholder proponent might counter these observations by 
noting that legally sanctioned antitakeover measures increase the costs 
of takeovers and thereby diminish the intensity of market discipline 
and lead to increased agency costs.  That point certainly carries for 
some firms at some times.97  But the Jensen and Meckling model antic-
 
95 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance:  
What’s Right and What’s Wrong? 7-8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Pa-
per No. 23/2003, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=441100 (“[T]he accom-
plishments of the 1980s were by no means forgotten.  By the 1990s U.S. managers, 
boards, and institutional shareholders had seen what LBOs and other market-driven 
restructurings could do.”).  
96 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 59, at 897-99 (observing that “the use of adaptive 
devices seems to work reasonably well”). 
97 We note, however, that empirical results on the economic effects of takeover 
defenses across the board are mixed.  The literature on takeover defenses provides a 
good example of the empirical back-and-forth.  Many assert that takeover vulnerability 
influences stock prices even today.  Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick compared portfolios 
made up of firms with “strong” and “weak” shareholder protections (with “weak” in-
cluding antitakeover protection) and showed that, between 1990 and 1998, a long po-
sition in strong-protection firms and a short position in weak-protection firms would 
have earned an annual abnormal return of 8.5%.  Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew 
Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 144 (2003).  Beb-
chuk and Cohen conducted a subsequent test focused on the staggered board, which, 
together with the ubiquitous poison pill, makes for a state-of-the-art defensive barrier.  
They show a statistically significant reduction in firm value at the 99% confidence level.  
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 
421 (2005).  They also test for economic significance, finding that a staggered board 
lowers Tobin’s Q by 17 points.  Id. at 424.  A number of complementary studies show 
connections between antitakeover provisions and specific undesirable results—bad 
mergers, higher wages, and low management turnover.  See Kenneth A. Borokhovich, 
Kelly R. Brunarski & Robert Parrino, CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. 
FIN. 1495, 1496 (1997) (correlating antitakeover adoption and higher levels of com-
pensation); Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance and Acquirer 
Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1883 (2007) (studying 3333 acquisitions from 1990 to 2003 and 
showing lower abnormal bidder returns for firms with antitakeover provisions, control-
ling for product market competition, equity-based pay, institutional ownership, and 
board characteristics); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, The Decline of Takeovers 
and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 206 (1997) (comparing 
management turnover in two periods, 1984–1988 and 1989–1993).    
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ipates these costs, too, with its residuum of irreducible agency costs.  
Given all of the adjustments described above, it is hard to project a re-
vival for the hostile takeover, quite apart from the costs incident to an-
titakeover regulation. 
B.  New Blockholders 
Shareholders who own large blocks of stock suffer no lack of em-
powerment, whether they own controlling blocks or noncontrolling 
blocks of sufficient size to assure board representation and inside in-
fluence.  Shareholder proponents have long bemoaned the relative 
absence of these blockholders in U.S. equity capital structures, specu-
lating that they might, if we had them, make up the disciplinary deficit 
under the prevailing legal model.  They once looked to blockholding 
arrangements in corporate governance systems in other countries to 
 
 None of this is conclusive.  Endogeneity problems prevent the studies from prov-
ing conclusively that antitakeover provisions cause lower stock prices.  Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick’s abnormal positive returns could represent unanticipated benefits of 
good governance or may reflect environmental changes unrelated to governance.  See 
Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control 43 (Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461 (warning of the limitations of Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick’s findings).  In addition, the market may take antitakeover provisions as a sig-
nal of poor management quality or a lack of shareholder orientation.  See John C. 
Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill:  A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 271, 301-02 (2000) (acknowledging that market reaction to antitakeover 
measures will depend on investors’ prior beliefs about management and shareholder 
orientation).  Other unobservable variables may be in play.  Market actors may simply 
overestimate the salience of the takeover threat.  Chief executives may do the same 
thing.  Finally, a study of the performance of the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick portfolio 
after 2003 reverses the performance result, suggesting that the original result was sensi-
tive to the distinct performance patterns of technology firms during the study period.  
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak 
Stock Returns?  An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. 
FIN. 655, 681-84 (2006) (showing that the poor-governance-performance portfolio out-
performed the good-governance-performance portfolio during 2000–2003, and finding 
no evidence of a causal relationship between governance and operating performance). 
 It should also be noted that other studies of takeover defenses reach the opposite 
conclusion.  One study of the subsequent performance of firms adopting takeover de-
fenses finds no performance decline.  See Mark S. Johnson & Ramesh P. Rao, The Im-
pact of Antitakeover Amendments on Corporate Financial Performance, 32 FIN. REV. 659, 660, 
669 (1997) (surveying a range of financial measures with respect to more than 600 an-
titakeover amendments adopted between 1979 and 1985 and finding no adverse ef-
fect).  Later performance improvement has even been detected.  See Laura Casares 
Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1857, 1883 (2002) 
(comparing initial public offering (IPO) firms with and without takeover defenses and 
finding that defenseless firms underperform for the first two years but that there are 
no significant performance differences thereafter). 
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see if conditions favorable to blockholding could be replicated here, 
but without success.98  Yet, in recent years, after all hope seemed lost, 
homegrown blockholders did appear, but not in the form predicted. 
Activist hedge funds broke the mold.  They take significant equity 
stakes in target companies—generally five to fifteen percent of the 
target’s stock is the range.  They mount hostile challenges to manag-
ers and business plans at publicly traded firms worldwide.  They are 
impatient shareholders, who look for value and want it realized in the 
near or intermediate term.  They tell managers how to realize the val-
ue and challenge publicly those who resist the advice, using the proxy 
contest as a threat.  The strategy proved successful during the bull 
market run up to 2008.99  The leading empirical study looks at the pe-
riod 2001 to 2006 and pairs 236 activist hedge funds with 1059 public-
ly traded targets.100  These activist engagements persist, albeit in dimi-
nished numbers since the financial collapse.101  Whether the number 
of targets rises or falls in the future is unclear, because an upward 
 
98 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS:  THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 223-24 (1994) (discussing how U.S. concentration 
trends slowed in the early 1980s and how, in the 1990s, they were only moving slightly 
toward the large blocks present in Japan and Germany); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders:  The Place of the MSIC in the 
Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1006-09 (1993) (mentioning several 
empirical studies that show a “mildly positive relationship between active large-block 
shareholders and corporate performance”).  It turned out that the incentives that sup-
ported blockholding abroad could not be replicated domestically.  Path dependencies 
within the system retarded its adaptability.  At the same time, blockholding in other 
countries followed from their different political environments, particularly their 
stronger social democratic systems.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory 
of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 169 
(1999) (positing that path dependence causes advanced economies to differ in their 
ownership structure, despite pressures to converge); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution 
in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 644-46 (1996) (describing how both path 
dependence and chaos theory account for variations in institutions, within a range of 
acceptable economic efficiency). 
99 See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Per-
formance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1739-45 (2008) (listing and discussing five motives for hedge 
fund activism and describing two examples of activist events). 
100 Id. at 1739. 
101 See, e.g., Josh Hyatt, Getting Smaller, But Not Quieter, CFO, Feb. 2009, at 17 (dis-
cussing how, despite decreasing hedge fund assets, the hedge fund industry still ap-
peals to risk-taking activist investors looking for undervalued companies); Ken Squire, 
A Golden Age for Activist Investing, BARRON’S, Feb. 16, 2009, at 30 (describing the perfect 
situation for activist shareholders:  enthusiasm for shareholder rights and distressed eq-
uity markets); Gregory Zuckerman, Activists Must Adjust Their Aim, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 
2009, at C10 (noting that while the flow of new activist engagements continues, funds 
have lost value in lockstep with market averages, leading to investor withdrawals). 
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stock market and ready credit together played an important role in 
facilitating the phenomenon. 
The activist funds have drawn heavily on the financial agenda in 
the shareholders’ agency-cost playbook.102  There are four main means 
to the end of agency-cost reduction and value creation:  increasing le-
verage, returning excess cash to shareholders, realizing premiums 
through the sale of going-concern assets, and cutting operating costs.  
The activists for the most part drew on the first three plays, using their 
newly discovered power to prompt borrowing, force the disgorgement 
of large cash accounts and the sale of operating divisions, and, in 
some cases, force the sale of the target company itself.103  In contrast, 
the record on cost-cutting initiatives, which tend to require expertise 
and knowledge respecting internal operations, is sketchier.104 
Meanwhile, the activists’ record of success further testifies to the 
capital markets’ ability to adapt within the prevailing legal framework.  
The strategy, while hostile, only rarely looks to the market for corpo-
rate control.105  Instead, the players act out a game of threat and resis-
tance, in which victory lies in either the target’s diffusion of the threat 
with a governance concession or, in the larger number of cases, with 
the insurgent’s entry to the boardroom as a minority blockholder.  
Payoff through board membership means taking the benefit of the 
richer informational base available inside the company and, in many 
cases, movement toward a cooperative outcome.106 
Significantly, the appearance of these new blockholders can be ex-
plained by reference to the alignment of incentives bound up in their 
shareholding.  Hedge funds are independent actors, where other insti-
tutional investors are not.  They do not sell services to the class of com-
panies they target and so, unlike conventional mutual fund advisors, are 
unconflicted.107  They lock up investor money for longer periods than 
do mutual funds and thus have time horizons better suited to gover-
 
102 See supra text accompanying note 80. 
103 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 
1390-1401 (2007) (listing and describing four ways in which an activist investor with 
influence can get an immediate return on investment:  get the target to sell itself, get 
the target to sell a major asset, get the target to pay out spare cash, or have the target 
change its long-term business plans). 
104 Id. at 1413-15. 
105 Id. at 1426-27. 
106 Id. at 1428.  At the same time, activist hedge funds rely on trading-market li-
quidity to facilitate exit at a time of their own choosing.  Id. at 1412-13. 
107 Id. at 1384. 
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nance activism.108  Finally, the funds in question concentrate on funda-
mental analysis109 and so pick their targets on a fuller informational ba-
sis than customarily is the case with institutional equity investors. 
It follows that the barriers to shareholder intervention embedded 
in the prevailing legal model are less salient than previously assumed.  
The problem lies less with the legal model and more with incentive 
constraints bound up in institutional shareholding.  The landscape, 
however, is dynamic.  The hedge funds have inspired interventions by 
large, mainstream investment advisors; they also have depended on 
and received the support of other, more passive institutional inves-
tors.110  The emerging picture bespeaks the robustness of a system that 
channels shareholder inputs through the board-election franchise. 
The point is not that hedge fund activism by itself reduces agency 
costs to zero.111  Indeed, activist shareholder intervention, whether 
from a hedge fund blockholder or in the course of a private equity 
buyout, confirms the continued presence of the agency costs that 
shareholder proponents seek to control.112  The point instead is that, 
given agency costs and the right incentive alignment, the system will 
 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 1383. 
110 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 84, at 14-17 (discussing changes in mutual funds, 
such as more activist behavior, which is usually expected from hedge funds, and coop-
eration with hedge funds designed to pressure a target’s management).  
111 Private equity, which carries blockholding to its logical conclusion, presents a 
telling comparison case.  It has had a mesmerizing effect on some agency theorists, 
who have proposed ownership by private equity funds as a strong-form solution to the 
problem of separated ownership and control.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. 
Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity:  Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital 
Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231-32 (2008) (theorizing that private owners can 
transfer risk in discrete slices to parties who can manage or diversify away those risks, 
which serves as a lower-cost substitute for traditional risk capital); Michael C. Jensen, 
Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989, at 61 (encouraging 
private equity ownership as a solution to “the conflict between owners and managers 
over the control and use of corporate resources”). 
112 It also should be noted that agency costs at target companies do not by them-
selves necessarily trigger the requisite financial incentives for outside intervention.  Buy-
outs thrive on cheap, available credit and occur cyclically with its availability.  Bratton, 
supra note 94, at 521-23.  Unsurprisingly, “[p]rivate equity volume plummeted 69 percent 
in 2008 because of the lack of credit.”  Lindsay Fortado, Linklaters Tops Deal Advisers as 
M&A Volume Plummets 38 Percent, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 2, 2009, available at http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aNZBdBiog9_0&refer=home.  Since then, 
many deals have been restructured, with equity swapped for debt.  See Jason Kelly & Jo-
nathan Keehner, Private Equity Indigestion Comes with Bain Bloomin’ Onion Debts, BLOOM-
BERG, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601109&sid=apUN4GkGPA.I&refer=home (discussing firms’ employment of tools 
such as debt exchanges and equity infusions to restructure and save deals). 
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address them aggressively, just as Jensen and Meckling predicted.  
With managers, the critical incentive change involved incentive com-
pensation.  With shareholders, the incentive barrier stemmed from 
the shareholders’ own institutional frameworks.  Once a framework 
conducive to governance intervention finally appeared, the capital 
markets provided ready support and the prevailing legal model 
proved facilitative. 
C.  Cash Payouts 
Cash disgorgement is a leading shareholder agenda item.  Accord-
ing to an account that Michael Jensen articulated in the 1980s, man-
agers habitually hold onto their spare cash, tending to reinvest it in 
suboptimal projects.113  Suboptimal reinvestment, together with con-
glomerate bust up, was widely held to be the motivation for 1980s ta-
keovers.  It remains at the top of the shareholder financial agenda, 
even as empirical studies of the problem of suboptimal reinvestment 
of cash flow have produced mixed results.114 
Whether or not cash retention remains a serious governance 
problem, the cash-disgorgement agenda registered in boardrooms 
with unprecedented success during the later stages of the most recent 
bull market.  Figure 1 below tracks shareholder payouts in the form of 
dividends and stock repurchases by the companies in the S&P 500 
from 1987 to 2007.  The year 1987 is taken as the start date because it 
marks the beginning of a three-decade trend of increased resort to 
open-market repurchases by public companies.115  The 1987 year-end 
S&P 500 average (247), the companies’ total annual dividend pay-
ments in 1987 ($44.3 billion) and their 1987 total repurchases ($32.5 
billion) are pegged at 100 on the vertical axis.  Figure 1 shows relative 
 
113 Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986). 
114 Compare Henri Servaes, Do Takeover Targets Overinvest?, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 253, 
254 (1994) (looking at over 700 takeover targets during the period of 1972 to 1987 and 
finding overinvestment only in the larger firms in the sample and in the oil and gas 
industry), with Sheridan Titman et al., Capital Investments and Stock Returns 13 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9951, 2003), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w9951 (showing a negative connection between high levels of 
investment and stock returns). 
115 The crash of 1987 amounted to an external shock that moved payout policy in 
the direction of repurchases.  See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 845, 871 (2005) (“[The] OMR [(open market repurchase)] advantage was first 
discovered in the wake of the stock market crash of 1987.  The crash brought an un-
precedented increase in OMR programs . . . .”).  
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increases and decreases to 2008, when the S&P 500 closed at 366, total 
dividends were $247 billion, and total repurchases were $340 billion.  
A break in two longstanding trends occurred in 2004.  Prior thereto, 
increases in levels of dividends and levels of repurchases roughly 
tracked increases in stock prices (with both tending to lag behind the 
market).  There was also a trend of rough parity between total divi-
dends and total repurchases.  Both trends ended in 2003 in favor of 
an increase in net amounts paid out, with the lion’s share of the in-
crease in the form of repurchases.  In 1987, repurchases amounted to 
1.6% of average market capitalization, and total payout amounted to 
3.8%; in 2007, repurchases amounted to 4.6%, and total payout 
amounted to 6.3%.  The dollar amount of annual repurchases in-
creased eighteen-fold from 1987 to the peak year of 2007.116 
 Clearly, managers had become more attuned to the shareholder 
agenda.117  Whether hedge fund activism played a role is a matter of 
speculation, but the suggestion arises.118  The suggestion in the end 
leads us back to the Jensen and Meckling model.  Given excess cash 
available for distribution, market-based demands for distribution will 
follow in the ordinary course.119  The notable increase in overall levels 
paid out suggests an additional point:  once the market input regis-
ters, many managers can be expected to respond voluntarily.  
  
 
116 The pattern changed in other respects as well.  Prior to 2004, numbers of out-
standing shares tended to remain constant even as repurchase activity increased, with 
new issues of shares incident to merger activity and employee stock option exercises 
matching or exceeding numbers repurchased.  From 2004 to 2007, in contrast, 65.1% of 
S&P 500 repurchasers reduced numbers of shares outstanding. STANDARD & POOR’S, 
S&P 500 BUYBACKS:  THREE YEARS AND $1.3 TRILLION LATER 6 (2007), available at http:// 
www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/121307_SP500_THREE_YEARS_OF_BUY
BACKS.pdf.  
117 The financial crisis materially chilled buyback activity in 2008, when “S&P 500 
buybacks reached $339.6 billion—a 42.3% drop from the record setting $589.1 billion 
spent during 2007.”  Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, S&P 500 Stock Buybacks Re-
treat 66% in Fourth Quarter; Off 42% in 2008 (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http:// 
www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/032609_Buyback-PR.pdf?vregion= 
us&vlang=en.   
118 A second factor also should be noted.  As between dividends and repurchases, 
managers holding unexercised stock options have a financial incentive to make repur-
chases.  Bratton, supra note 115, at 872-76. 
119 Even as the pattern began to change in 2004 and 2005, Wall Street analysts 
were complaining that corporations were husbanding cash at historically high levels.  
See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 103, at 1394 (noting that in 2006 “the S&P 500’s cash ac-
counts stood at the highest point since the early 1980s” and that shareholders main-
tained the position that free cash flow should be paid out).  
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D.  Summary 
This Section’s title, “Systemic Responsiveness,” summarizes our 
reading of institutional changes within corporate governance.  It is an 
agency-cost story that starts out at the same place and time as the 
shareholder story—namely, with the external shocks of the 1980s.  
The shocks—deregulation, globalization, and new technology—were 
exogenous to the corporate governance system but stemmed from 
endogenous adjustments elsewhere in the economy.  The shareholder 
story freezes the frame at the end of the 1980s conflicts, making its 
case for law reform by depicting the governance system as static and 
unresponsive.  We move the frame forward in time to show that the 
corporate governance system made a series of endogenous adjust-
ments addressed to agency-cost control both in the boardroom and in 
the financial markets.  Significantly, none of the changes described 
required resort to new regulation. 
The prevailing legal model emerges as a constant factor in this 
picture of dynamic change.  The constancy follows from the legal 
model’s capaciousness.  It sets out a minimal list of mandates—
management by the board, annual election by the shareholders, and 
the managers’ duty of loyalty.  Within this framework, parties may 
conduct governance as they deem appropriate.  Thus the model can 
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the one hand and shareholder activism and management disempo-
werment on the other.  Particular results follow from incentives, which 
in turn originate in contracts between the corporation and its manag-
ers and contracts between investing entities and their investors. 
Our argument puts agency costs, as discussed in policy contexts, 
back in touch with their theoretical roots.  Jensen and Meckling pre-
dicted not only dynamic adaptation toward the end of removing mon-
ey from the table but an agency-cost residuum too costly for removal 
through private ordering.  An important point follows:  persistent re-
sidual agency costs do not by themselves justify regulatory interven-
tion.  The cost-benefit case for reducing residual agency costs by regu-
lation must be made independently, and it may lead to the conclusion 
that the participants are better off bearing the residual costs.  The 
shareholders emphasize benefits only, ignoring the costs implied by 
their suggested reforms.  Part III confronts these costs. 
We close this Part with three caveats respecting normative implica-
tions.  First, this is a positive account, put forward to import balance to 
the factual background in which shareholder reform proposals are 
evaluated and to denude it of any suggestion of economic urgency.  
Second, the endogenous changes we describe have contractual origins 
and so benefit from a normative presumption in their favor.  But 
normative questions are by no means foreclosed.  We will ask a few of 
our own, respecting equity incentive pay, in Parts III and IV.  Third, 
our picture of systemic responsiveness would, if extended to the ex-
treme, imply that law is irrelevant.  We would not make this extension.  
To the contrary, we think that law matters here because it accords the 
board of directors a zone of discretion in which to make informed 
business decisions disfavored by the market, a view presented more 
fully in Part III. 
III.  SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT AND ECONOMIC THEORY 
Everybody agrees that managers know more than shareholders.  
Everybody also agrees that agency costs arise when managers use this 
informational advantage for their own gain.  The result is one of the 
paradigmatic problems that corporate law tries to solve.  Shareholder 
advocates would address the problem by giving the shareholders suffi-
cient power to impress their preferences, as expressed in market price 
signals, upon the managers.  This gives rise to two key questions:  what 
do the shareholders whose trades shape market prices actually know, 
and what does the market price teach the wider group of sharehold-
ers?  Shareholder empowerment assumes that the price setters know 
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quite a bit and that the wider group learns a lot from the price the for-
mer set, including not only the true value of the corporation but an-
swers to specific questions such as whether or not managers are doing a 
good enough job to deserve the compensation proposed by the board 
of directors.  In this Part, we appraise these assumptions, addressing the 
question of what shareholders actually know and taking into account 
not only the traditional literature on information asymmetries but also 
the emerging literature on heterogeneous expectations. 
We begin on the positive side of the street, stating the best case for 
shareholder empowerment.  This conjoins the semi-strong form of the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) and the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) to depict a world in which market prices, al-
though reflecting only information from past market prices and cur-
rent publicly available information, accurately reflect expectations 
respecting future fundamental value.  We show that the market price, 
thus modeled, can indeed signal a need to reduce agency costs.  But 
we also highlight a problem of diminishing returns.  The market price 
sends reliable governance signals only in a subset of cases characte-
rized by clear-cut issues and minimal information asymmetries.  As go-
vernance issues become more complex and information asymmetries 
more pervasive, market signals become difficult to read. 
We then cross to the negative side of the street to confront a criti-
cal question:  if management’s informational superiority presents a 
paradigmatic problem, how does the stock price surmount the infor-
mation asymmetry barrier?  The answer is that it does not.  Strong-
form efficiency, under which the stock price impounds all private as 
well as public information, does not hold; hence, managers know 
more than they disclose and the stock price does not impound the 
undisclosed information.  Traditional ECMH makes a relatively mod-
est claim respecting the informativeness of the market price.  Its im-
plications for corporate governance are therefore modest. 
Finally, we tread deeper into negative territory to ask what hap-
pens when managers shape business policy to cater to uninformed 
market prices.  This inquiry upsets the neatness of even the limited 
claims that market efficiency holds for corporate governance.  New 
corporate finance models based on heterogeneous expectations make 
particularly stark projections of suboptimal results.  The heterogeneity 
models show that the information conveyed by the price sometimes 
can be misleading for purposes of business policymaking.  These pe-
riods, although limited, are important. 
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We go on to explore these models’ implications for corporate go-
vernance, reaching two critical conclusions:  First, shareholder empo-
werment will make it much more difficult for a good board of directors 
to resist pressures to manage to the market.  This can lead to bad busi-
ness decisions, either due to information asymmetry or a run of specul-
ative mispricing.  Second, incentive-compatible executive compensation 
and shareholder empowerment are inconsistent goals.  If executive 
compensation can be fixed by requiring longer holding periods, it is 
then turned around and unfixed if managers are encouraged to man-
age the market as a response to shareholder empowerment. 
We note a methodological constraint.  We confine our economic 
evaluation to the rational-expectations framework held out by tradi-
tional financial economics.  We think this “high church” literature 
more than suffices to undercut the case for shareholder empower-
ment.  At the same time, we acknowledge a significant body of beha-
vioral work on market pricing, both theoretical and empirical.120  We 
omit reference to it for simplicity, toward the end of avoiding an un-
necessary excursion onto disputed methodological territory. 
Section A shows what market pricing efficiency can and cannot do 
for the shareholder case.  Section B, describing the pricing salience of 
 
120 These studies focus on sentiment, investment styles, and asset tastes.  For a re-
view of the behavioral finance literature, including studies in trading activity, research 
in corporate finance, and analyses of stock returns, see Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Be-
havioural Finance:  A Review and Synthesis, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 12 (2007).  Traditional 
pricing theory holds that the prices of two assets move together as a result of comove-
ment in fundamental value.  But, given market frictions, limits to arbitrage, and irra-
tional (or “sentimental”) investors, comovement might have other causes.  Coordi-
nated demand, then, influences prices.  See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Investor 
Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 61 J. FIN. 1645, 1648-50 (2006) (examin-
ing sentiment’s impact on the cross section of stock returns from 1963 to 2001 and 
showing that high-sentiment investors gravitate to young, small, unprofitable growth 
stocks or distressed issues, while low-sentiment investors like large, profitable dividend 
payers, and that abrupt changes in sentiment result in demand shocks for sensitive 
stocks); Nicholas Barberis et al., Comovement, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 284 (2005) (showing 
that investors group assets into categories); Nicholas Barberis & Andrei Shleifer, Style 
Investing, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 161, 162-64 (2003) (examining the impact of style investing 
on institutional and individual investors); Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institu-
tional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 229, 230-36, 244 (2001) (showing that 
institutions like large, liquid stocks with relatively low returns in the year prior to pur-
chase, and that institutional demand for large issues accounted for nearly fifty percent 
of the issues’ relative price appreciation of large over small stocks across the period 
1980 to 1996); Alok Kumar & Charles M.C. Lee, Retail Investor Sentiment and Return 
Comovements, 61 J. FIN. 2451, 2453-54 (2006) (showing that retail investors tend to nest 
in small firms, lower-price firms, firms with relatively low levels of institutional owner-
ship, and value firms).  
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information asymmetries, shows that the best case is incomplete.  Sec-
tion C details the impact of heterogeneous investor expectations and 
the value-destructive effects of managing to a speculative market. 
A.  Pricing Efficiency and the Case for Shareholder Empowerment 
If financial markets were strong-form efficient, stock prices would 
fully and correctly reflect all relevant information, both public and 
private.  In such a state of the world, the shareholder proponents’ case 
would be compelling, and the paradigmatic problem of corporate law 
would vanish.  Shareholders could know as much as the managers if 
they carefully scrutinized the stock price and attended to public dis-
closures and leaks of material nonpublic information.  Powerful im-
plications for corporate governance would obtain. 
If shareholders were thus informed, directors might understanda-
bly view themselves more as agents of the shareholders and less as 
their trustees.  As faithful agents, the directors would seek to learn 
their principals’ wishes.  The financial market would hold out the best 
source of this information, since the movement of stock prices would 
reveal the shareholders’ well-informed preferences respecting corpo-
rate developments.  Managers might even vet investment decisions 
with the market and observe the pricing effect, adopting strategies 
leading to stock price increases and abandoning those leading to 
stock price declines. 
But this is not the state of the world according to the modern cor-
porate finance literature, a literature with complex and easily misun-
derstood implications for corporate governance.  We explore these 
below and contend that one thing is clear:  shareholder proponents 
wrongly assume that agency costs can be reduced without countervail-
ing negative effects when directors act more like agents and manage 
to shareholder preferences signaled in market prices. 
1.  ECMH, CAPM, and the Value of a Share 
Markets would be strong-form efficient if they priced in all infor-
mation—material nonpublic information as well as all public informa-
tion.  It is, however, generally accepted that financial markets are not 
strong-form efficient.121  In contrast, ECMH’s semi-strong form is gener-
 
121 See, e.g., STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 359 (6th ed. 2002) 
(“Even the strongest adherents to the efficient-market hypothesis would not be sur-
prised to find that markets are inefficient in the strong form.”). 
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ally accepted.  This, sometimes called “informational efficiency,” posits 
that the capital markets embed all publicly available information into 
security prices.122  It has two implications:  first, that no trading strategy 
based on public information can regularly outperform the market,123 
and, second, that insiders who possess nonpublic information can out-
perform the market when trading in their own stock.124  The latter point 
is hardly surprising since it means that insiders, even after making all 
required disclosures, remain better informed than outsiders.  Add this 
up and an important point emerges for our argument:  informational 
asymmetries exist in tandem with “informational efficiency,” with the 
managers and directors having the informational advantage. 
Now for a second key point:  the informational efficiency posited 
by ECMH does not imply that the share price equals the pro rata value 
of the discounted free cash flows of the corporation.125  This is a point 
that is often misunderstood.  To say that no investment strategy can 
outperform the market does not in itself say anything about the stock 
price’s accuracy in measuring the corporation’s fundamental value—
that is, the discounted value of expected future free cash flows.  ECMH 
 
122 See Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DIC-
TIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 739, 739 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992).  ECMH 
asserts that the stock market possesses efficiency attributes in terms of three alterna-
tive, progressively more inclusive information sets.  See, e.g., id. at 739-41.  The first, or 
weak form, defines market efficiency in terms of past market prices.  The market is ef-
ficient according to the weak form if investors cannot predict future stock price 
movements based on an information set containing all past price movements.  As 
noted in the text, the second, or semi-strong form, defines market efficiency in terms 
of all publicly available information.  The third, or strong form, includes nonpublic 
information as part of the information set.  Markets are efficient according to the 
strong form if stock prices include all nonpublic information as well as public informa-
tion.  Consequently, if the strong form were to hold, an investor who was privy to both 
private and nonprivate information could not consistently earn abnormally large in-
vestment returns.  
123 See id. at 739 (asserting that under the “semi-strong form of EMH . . . an analy-
sis of balance sheets, income statements, announcements of dividend changes or stock 
splits or any other public information about a company . . . will not yield abnormal 
economic profits”). 
124 See Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 
1661, 1696 (1992) (“The analysis suggests that insider trading increases stock price ac-
curacy by moving stock prices significantly.”); see also Dirk Jenter, Market Timing and 
Management Portfolio Decisions, 60 J. FIN. 1903, 1906 (2005) (showing that managers 
trade as contrarians and earn excess returns on their trades, but that the excess returns 
disappear after controlling for size and book-to-market effects).  
125 See JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 24-25 
(1997) (discussing reasons why “perfect [stock] efficiency is an unrealistic benchmark 
that is unlikely to hold in practice”). 
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only requires that stock price movements mirror a random walk,126 and, 
as long as stock price movements are random, outguessing the market 
is not possible.  Whether the random walk moves around, away from, 
or ultimately always stumbles into the correct price is another matter.  
To evaluate this possibility, we must look to CAPM. 
The corporation is a collection of assets and its value is the free 
cash flow that those assets are expected to generate into the indefinite 
future.  CAPM provides the discount rate needed to state those ex-
pected future free cash flows as a present value.127  The discount rate 
reflects the riskiness of the expected flows—the more risky the flows, 
the higher the discount rate and the lower the present value.  CAPM is 
a theory of risk that boils down to the assertion that a given corpora-
tion’s discount rate will be proportional to its expected future free 
cash flows’ covariance with the economy’s free cash flows. 
With these building blocks, we can further investigate the ques-
tion whether efficient stock prices provide an accurate measure of the 
fundamental value of the corporation—that is, the discounted value 
of the firm’s expected future free cash flows.  All turns on the word 
“expected” in the concept of “expected free cash flows.”  Since future 
results are unknowable, fundamental value turns on expected rather 
than actual cash flows.  Nothing in the theory even remotely suggests 
that these future expectations will be borne out by the passage of 
time.  Expectations can turn out to be wildly incorrect. 
Despite this, the statement that “stock market prices are always 
correct” remains close to being definitionally true.  The syllogism is 
the following:  first, financial markets do capture future expectations 
more reliably than any other mechanism; second, fundamental value 
turns on expectations of the future free cash flows.  Since the market 
provides the most reliable estimate of future expectations, it is reason-
able to define value in terms of market price. 
The market-based definition of value is particularly appealing for 
corporate law because it follows from the valuations of willing buyers 
and sellers.  A key assumption in this line of reasoning, homogeneity 
 
126 RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 333-41 (8th ed. 
2006). 
127 See John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments 
in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13, 27 (1965) (“The analy-
sis thus justifies viewing market values as riskless-rate present values of certainty-
equivalents of random future receipts . . . .” (italics omitted)); William F. Sharpe, Capi-
tal Asset Prices:  A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 436-
42 (1964) (describing the “consistent relationship between . . . expected returns and 
what might best be called systematic risk”). 
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of expectations, further enhances its appeal.128  CAPM assumes that all 
individuals have access to all of the publicly available information and 
reach the same expectations about the future.  As a result, CAPM as-
sumes that all investors employ the same valuation metrics and share 
prevailing market expectations.  Shareholders, market price setters, and 
passive proxy voters alike become one.  Under this model of value, the 
shareholders expeditiously can deliver governance instructions through 
the market price.  To see how, imagine that a shareholders’ meeting 
was convened to set a value on the company.  Under this unitary model 
of the shareholder, the resulting value would be the market price; it fol-
lows that the meeting need not be called in the first place.  More gen-
erally, under an agency model of the corporation, the manager-agents 
should look to the market price for the principal’s instructions. 
Of course, expectations do differ among investors in the real 
world.  One still might believe that the market price reflects the aver-
age shareholder’s expectations and so provides a reliable proxy for 
fundamental value.  As we shall see below, however, switching to an 
assumption of heterogeneous expectations generates results that lead 
to profoundly different implications for corporate law. 
2.  Implications for the Case for Shareholder Empowerment 
Shareholder proponents take the market price, as modeled in tradi-
tional financial economics, as the best available projection of a corpora-
tion’s expected future cash flows.  They then hold it out as an essential 
point of reference in the detection and reduction of management agen-
cy costs.  They do not deny the existence of information asymmetries 
but, at least implicitly, assume them to have been minimized by increases 
in market efficiency and a thick layer of disclosure requirements.129 
A hostile tender offer for a publicly traded company presents the 
best case for this approach.  Hypothesize an offer at a substantial pre-
mium over the market price and incumbent managers who contend that 
their business plan holds out superior prospects for long-term value en-
hancement.  How should the target’s directors respond?  With minimal 
information asymmetries, the answer is clear:  the directors should ac-
 
128 See Sharpe, supra note 127, at 433-34 (assuming “homogeneity of investor ex-
pectations” as a condition for equilibrium in capital markets).  
129 See Gordon, supra note 51, at 1548-63 (describing the increase in the content 
and scope of mandated disclosures over the last fifty years and suggesting a causal role 
in the rise of the independent board). 
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cept the voice of the shareholders as expressed through the market 
price, which elevates the bid price over the incumbents’ business plan. 
The case is easy because information asymmetries do not complicate 
it.  In the shareholder proponents’ view, when management holds out its 
business plan as superior in the teeth of the market’s rejection, it inap-
propriately uses its position of informational superiority as an excuse for 
what amounts to self-interested entrenchment.  In the informationally 
rich environment of the takeover market, it can be argued that informa-
tional asymmetries are at their lowest level.  Given this, the shareholders 
know the value of the corporation substantially as well as the managers 
do.  It follows that the market price is the only metric needed to decide 
the appropriate outcome and that the legal rule should allow share-
holders to decide the contest for control at the tendering stage. 
Now consider a more difficult case, which concerns the selection 
of the terms of an executive compensation scheme.  In theory, a given 
scheme should be geared to the recent performance of the individual 
executives.  This recent data, however, will not be fully available to the 
public.  Even given the full set of data, choices remain respecting the 
terms of the performance-based compensation scheme.  The actor de-
signing the package must exercise judgment, for, in practice, there is 
no generally accepted template that sets out the terms of an optimal 
package.130  Now imagine a package assembled and submitted to the 
shareholders pursuant to a “say on pay” mandate.  How will the share-
holders evaluate the plan?  Given all of the above, the vote likely will 
reflect levels of satisfaction with recent price performance rather than 
considered views about optimal incentive pay or the full set of per-
formance data, much of which will remain unobservable. 
More generally, as information asymmetries become greater in 
scope, which occurs as business-policy choices become more complex, 
the stock price becomes less an objective report on a particular value 
outcome and more an input for interpretation.  Policymaking be-
comes an exercise calling for inside information, experience, and 
sound business judgment.  The tie between inputs garnered from 
shareholder votes, which in turn reflect overall levels of satisfaction 
with price performance, and the reduction of particular agency costs 
becomes much attenuated. 
 
130 For a presentation of the range of positions taken in the literature, see William 
W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 
1562-75 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFOR-
MANCE:  THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)). 
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Shareholder proponents do not deny this even as they seek to 
open doors to shareholder intervention.  They avoid the trap of re-
commending that uninformed shareholders routinely make business 
decisions by focusing on deterrent effects.131  Shareholder intervention 
emerges as a potential threat that managers will avoid by managing to 
the market.  The proponents’ case accordingly turns on an implicit 
assertion:  information asymmetries are small relative to the agency 
costs at stake, so that managing to the market either brings positive 
results or does no harm. 
We disagree with the assertion.  The importance of information 
asymmetries relative to agency costs is an empirical question to which 
no one has an answer.  The best that can be said for the shareholders is 
that their agenda’s credibility improves to the extent that information 
asymmetries are minimal.  But minimal information deficits cannot 
safely be assumed.  Section III.B, which follows, shows that information 
asymmetries are real.  Section III.B goes on to address the claim that 
managing to the market can do no harm, showing that managing to an 
uninformed market price can result in suboptimal business policy.  
That problem reemerges in more acute form in Section III.C, which 
discusses speculative overpricing under heterogeneous expectations. 
B.  The Information Asymmetry Problem 
We have seen that strong-form efficiency would support a nearly 
unassailable case for shareholder empowerment.  But financial markets 
are not strong-form efficient.  Information asymmetries are real.  Em-
pirical studies confirm this point beyond doubt, showing that managers 
who trade in their corporation’s shares earn abnormally high returns.132 
Information asymmetries make it difficult for the market to 
project accurately the free cash flows that the corporation will pro-
duce.  The difficulties extend to ascertainment of a capitalization 
rate,133 as well as to the projection of future free cash flows.  This Sec-
 
131 See supra text accompanying note 76. 
132 See Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance (asserting that “corporate 
managers have superior information about their own firm,” which “is underscored by 
the evidence that managers earn abnormally high returns on their own trades”), in 1 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE:  EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 145, 149 (B. Es-
pen Eckbo ed., 2007). 
133 It bears noting that the informational imbalance impacts both sides of the val-
uation exercise—the ascertainment of the discount rate as well as the projection of fu-
ture free cash flows.  See Wachter, supra note 44, at 792-93 (discussing the inability of 
existing models to accurately estimate the discount or market capitalization rates).  
CAPM provides the most common approach for accessing the risk premium in the dis-
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tion explores the implications of these difficulties for corporate go-
vernance.  It makes two points.  First, information asymmetries are not 
going to go away.  Second, the evidence confirms their status as a sa-
lient factor in business policymaking.  Systemic change that forced 
management to the market price would enhance their salience, in-
creasing agency costs.  An uninformed market is structurally incapable 
of sending business policymakers a determinative signal.  It follows 
that, given asymmetric information, market signals need to be inter-
preted on a continuous basis rather than followed blindly.  The job of 
interpretation is an intrinsic management function. 
1.  Persistence 
If information asymmetries would just go away, the case for share-
holder empowerment would be straightforward.  Yet shareholder pro-
ponents do not seek a level informational playing field.  There is no 
call for full disclosure in the form of a requirement that corporations 
disclose all relevant information,134 a requirement presently absent 
from both the federal securities laws and state corporate law. 
Nor should there be.  Corporate finance theory holds that full dis-
closure by the firm is prohibitively costly.135  Full (or fuller) disclosure 
carries costs of reduced incentives, increased regulation, and the pro-
prietary cost that follows from sharing private information with com-
peting firms.  It also holds out benefits.  Better quality disclosure can 
reduce the firm’s equity cost of capital and enhance the liquidity of its 
publicly traded securities.  In equilibrium, the level of disclosure fol-
lows from a trade-off of these costs and benefits, with different firms 
gravitating to different disclosure levels.136  Several mechanisms reduce 
 
count rate.  More specifically, it employs an empirically derived single risk factor, beta 
(β), that measures a given stock’s contribution to the systematic risk in the market 
portfolio.  Although betas customarily are estimated from market data, the true under-
lying beta depends on the covariance of the firm’s free cash flows with the overall mar-
ket’s free cash flows, factors that may be better known by the managers than the market.  
134 We have seen that this is Fama and Jensen’s basic point.  See supra text accom-
panying note 31. 
135 See S.J. Grossman & O.D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323, 
323-24 (1980) (illustrating formally that full disclosure presupposes three conditions:  
(1) that investors know that firms possess the information; (2) that affirmative misre-
presentation does not occur; and (3) that disclosure is costless). 
136 See John E. Core, A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature:  Discussion, 31 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 441, 442-44 (2001) (“This choice involves trading off the reduction in 
the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital that results from in-
creased disclosure quality against the costs of reduced incentives, litigation costs, and 
proprietary costs.” (citations omitted)).   
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the asymmetry without eliminating it—the mandatory disclosure sys-
tem, the work of financial analysts, and the investigations of large, ac-
tivist shareholders.137  The magnitude of the resulting imbalance varies 
from firm to firm, becoming more severe as the duration of the firm’s 
investments increases, the firm’s business plan focuses on growth, and 
the firm’s size is smaller.138 
2.  Evidence and Effects 
Information asymmetries figure prominently in leading economic 
accounts of corporate financial practices.139  Simply, managers take 
 
137 See Jeremy C. Stein, Agency, Information and Corporate Investment (noting that 
even as governance processes, capital structure, incentive contracts, intermediation, 
and the mandatory disclosure regime reduce informational distortions, some remain 
unresolved and relevant in equilibrium), in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
FINANCE 111, 115 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003). 
138 For example, a long-established business with no growth opportunities con-
fronts a relatively small information asymmetry problem.  It, accordingly, will have little 
incentive to go beyond mandated disclosure items.  In contrast, a firm with abundant 
growth opportunities and a more complicated information set has a more serious in-
formation asymmetry problem.  Depending on the interplay of costs and benefits, its 
managers may find it advantageous to make additional voluntary disclosures.  See Core, 
supra note 136, at 443 (examining which firms will find it optimal to make voluntary 
disclosures); see also Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate 
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets:  A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 405, 420-25 (2001) (examining the motives behind voluntary disclo-
sure).  Investor relations also influence these choices—firms with large analyst follow-
ings and large populations of institutional investors tend to disclose more.  See Healy & 
Palepu, supra, at 416-18 (suggesting that management might voluntarily disclose where 
analysts give favorable ratings); Paul M. Healy et al., Stock Performance and Intermediation 
Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure, 16 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 485, 489-
90 (1999) (noting that a multivariate analysis demonstrated that “increased disclosure 
is related to . . . growth in institutional ownership and analyst coverage”).  Finally, as 
the shareholder proponents assert, agency costs also play into the mix.  Managers have 
incentives to make self-serving disclosures.  See Healy & Palepu, supra, at 421, 425 (ex-
plaining that managers have incentives to make capital-cost-lowering disclosures).  Ulti-
mately, the credibility of any firm’s disclosures (and hence the firm’s proximity to the 
optimal level and quality of disclosure) depends on the effectiveness of its governance.  
See Core, supra note 136, at 444 (“[I]t is the governance structure that constrains the 
manager to follow optimal policy.”).  Empirical literature supports all of the foregoing 
points.  See Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Re-
porting and Disclosure Regulation:  A Review and Suggestions for Future Research 23-38 
(Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398. 
139 See, e.g., Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial 
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 372 (1977) (noting that while an 
entrepreneur may not be able to directly convey inside information, she may be able to 
signal that information to potential shareholders based on the fraction of equity that 
she retains); Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Informa-
tion, 40 J. FIN. 1031, 1031 (1985) (arguing that “managers know more than outside in-
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advantage of market overvaluation to tap the equity markets.  The pat-
tern shows up both with initial public offerings (IPOs) and equity of-
ferings by seasoned issuers.  For example, studies show that IPOs are 
positively correlated with ex ante indicators of overpricing, such as the 
industry’s market-to-book ratios and stock indexes.140  Seasoned issuers 
keep an eye out for market windows:  a survey of corporate CFOs 
shows that two-thirds look for market overvaluation before issuing eq-
uity.141  Studies also show that IPO issuers underperform relative to 
comparables for years after the offering,142 with the underperformance 
serving as ex post confirmation of overpricing at the time of the offer-
ing.  The same result occurs in the years after seasoned issuers sell 
more stock—the range of underperformance relative to the market is 
twenty to forty percent during the subsequent five years.143  Unsurpri-
singly, the asymmetrically informed markets react negatively to the 
 
vestors about the true state of the firm’s current earnings”); Stephen A. Ross, The De-
termination of Financial Structure:  The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23, 
27-31 (1977) (developing a model that establishes a signaling equilibrium based on the 
assumption that managers have inside information). 
140 See Baker et al., supra note 132, at 159-60 (surveying literature that suggests eq-
uity issuance is correlated with overvaluation); Joshua Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the 
Decision to Go Public, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 293-94, 299 (1994) (finding, in a comparison 
of the number of IPOs and a biotechnology equity index, that venture capitalists time 
IPOs and that “IPOs coincide with the peaks in equity valuations”); Tim Loughran et 
al., Initial Public Offerings:  International Insights, 2 PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 165, 166 (1994) 
(finding that, in fourteen of the fifteen countries examined, “IPO volume is positively 
correlated with the inflation-adjusted level of the stock market”); Marco Pagano et al., 
Why Do Companies Go Public?  An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 27, 28 (1998) (finding that 
“the main factor affecting the probability of an IPO is the market-to-book ratio at 
which firms in the same industry trade”). 
141 See Baker et al., supra note 132, at 159 (“Several lines of evidence suggest that 
overvaluation is a motive for equity issuance. . . . [Two-thirds] of CFOs of public corpo-
rations . . . state that ‘the amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued was 
an important or very important consideration’ in issuing equity.” (citations omitted)). 
142 See Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3, 3 
(1991) (contending that “in the long-run, initial public offerings appear to be over-
priced,” and finding that “in the 3 years after going public these firms significantly un-
derperformed a set of comparable firms matched by size and industry”).  Several em-
pirical studies have also found that for IPOs declining profitability and investment 
after the IPOs suggest that the issuances were incidences of market timing.  See Pagano 
et al., supra note 140, at 28-29 (“Our finding that investment and profitability decrease 
after the IPO points to the [attempt-to-time-the-market] explanation.”). 
143 See Baker et al., supra note 132, at 160 (“[O]n average, US equity issues under-
perform the market somewhere in the ballpark of 20-40% over five years.”); see also 
Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, The Equity Share in New Issues and Aggregate Stock Re-
turns, 55 J. FIN. 2219, 2219 (2000) (“When equity prices are too high, existing share-
holders benefit by issuing overvalued equity.  When equity prices are too low, issuing 
debt is preferable.  Consistent with this timing hypothesis, firms issuing equity have 
poor subsequent performance.”). 
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very announcement of a new stock offering.  This limits the availability 
of equity as a financing alternative, particularly when the managers 
deem their stock to be underpriced or correctly priced.144 
Perceived undervaluation also drives financing choices, but in the 
opposite direction.  These companies finance with debt rather than 
equity.145  And, instead of selling more stock, they repurchase stock 
previously issued.  Subsequent returns on repurchased stock are posi-
tive, running twelve percent above those on comparables over four 
years.146  Significantly, although the announcement of a repurchase 
program means a small bump for the stock price, the pattern of posi-
tive subsequent returns shows that the market does not fully assimilate 
the signal’s informational content.147 
Information asymmetries also lead to complications for corporate 
investment policy.  The complications arise when managers manage to 
the market, factoring expected stock price reactions into their deci-
sions.  To see the complications, hypothesize a company with a new, 
long-term investment project.  The new project is complicated and so 
presents the market with a costly and lengthy exercise in valuation.  As 
a result, the new project is likely to be mispriced by the market.148  Giv-
 
144 Managers who believe their stock to be correctly priced or underpriced will 
avoid selling new equity, financing with debt or internal cash flow.  See Stein, supra note 
137, at 118-19 (examining models of debt financing or cash-flow financing).  Managers 
of firms with good potential investments but constraints on these sources of financing 
must sell new equity or forego the investments.  They are forced to time their financ-
ing, and hence their investment, to the underinformed market price, with a sacrifice of 
flexibility.  See Malcolm Baker et al., When Does the Market Matter?  Stock Prices and the In-
vestment of Equity-Dependent Firms, 118 Q.J. ECON. 969, 986-90 (2003) (showing that in-
vestment by firms with financing constraints is sensitive to the market price). 
145 See Armen Hovakimian et al., The Debt-Equity Choice, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 1, 3-4 (2001) (determining that “firms with higher current stock prices (rela-
tive to their past stock prices, book values, or earnings) are more likely to issue equity 
rather than debt and repurchase debt rather than equity” and that this finding is “con-
sistent with agency and information asymmetry models where managers are either re-
luctant to issue equity at low prices or have an incentive to boost their leverage when 
the stock prices are low”); Paul Marsh, The Choice Between Equity and Debt:  An Empirical 
Study, 37 J. FIN. 121, 133 (1982) (finding that the total amount of U.K. companies’ eq-
uity and debt issues is related to the performance of the stock and bond markets). 
146 See David Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases, 
39 J. FIN. ECON. 181, 184 (1995) (“Beginning in the month following the repurchase 
announcement, the average buy-and-hold return over the next four years is more than 
12% above that of a control portfolio.”).   
147 See id. at 184 (“The most striking finding . . . is that the information conveyed 
by open market share repurchases is largely ignored.”).  
148 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors 
and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 148, 148 (1990) (“The time to disap-
pearance of mispricing depends on how fast . . . investor misperceptions are cor-
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en managers who cater to the stock price, the risk of underpricing may 
lead management to pass up the opportunity.149  The greater the stress 
on keeping up the stock price, the more likely this suboptimal result. 
Given an uninformed market and managers inclined to cater to 
the price, investment decisions may be keyed to what the market ex-
pects—its schematized picture of the company and its strategy and 
prospects.  When a manager sees an opportunity not yet in the market’s 
picture of the company and predicts that the market will react negative-
ly to a shift in emphasis, she must undertake a process of informational 
mediation.  The result is costly delay.150  Contrariwise, if the market ex-
 
rected . . . .”).  There are numerous articles providing empirical confirmation of this mi-
spricing.  See, e.g., Craig W. Holden & Leonard L. Lundstrum, Costly Trading, Managerial 
Myopia and Long-Term Investment 3-4 (Sept. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=809507 (showing that firms selected for long-term 
traded options (and hence a lower cost of trading on long-term information) increased 
their research and development (R&D) to sales ratios twenty-three percent to twenty-
eight percent compared to matching firms not selected for long-term traded options in 
the two years following selection); see also Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial 
Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63-67 (1988) (showing formally that, even absent agency 
costs, managers of a firm threatened by a takeover will sell an underpriced asset).  
 We note that direct empirical testing of these assertions is difficult.  This follows from 
the nature of the phenomenon predicted—underinvestment tends to be unobservable 
by the market.  See Stein, supra note 137, at 131 (noting that models of investment can be 
difficult to test because underinvestment occurs in “activities that are not directly observ-
able by the market” (emphasis omitted)).  Market-timing studies showing that firms is-
suing equity have strong operating numbers two years prior to the issuance and weak 
numbers thereafter provide indirect evidence, with underinvestment prior to the offer-
ing as a possible cause of the earnings pattern.  See id. at 132 (examining studies where 
circumstantial evidence of underinvestment results from such an earnings pattern). 
149 See Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the Coherence 
of Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV.  523, 551-56 (2003) (showing formally that 
managers vulnerable to a hostile offer and having better information about prospec-
tive investments will forego unpopular investment opportunities and fail to maximize 
the value of the corporation); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms:  
A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) (modeling subop-
timal investment where managers maximize a weighted average of near-term stock 
prices and long-run value); see also Miller & Rock, supra note 139, at 1031-33 (present-
ing a model of shareholder investment and management decisionmaking where 
asymmetric information leads to suboptimal levels of investment); M.P. Narayanan, 
Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 1469-70 (1985) (showing that 
reputational incentives can lead to underinvestment).  
150 See Philippe Aghion & Jeremy C. Stein, Growth Versus Margins:  Destabilizing Con-
sequences of Giving the Stock Market What It Wants, 63 J. FIN. 1025, 1025 (2008) (creating a 
model in which managers can devote resources to either increasing sales growth or 
improving per-unit profit margins and arguing that devoting resources to one end 
necessarily means sacrificing the other).  As modeled, the market puts more weight on 
growth metrics when it sees a growth firm and more weight on cost-cutting metrics 
when it sees a business plan focused on profit margins.  Id. at 1032-35.  Problems arise 
for a manager who decides, as events unfold in the product market, to move from a 
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pects a company to invest in a line of business that the market believes 
will be highly profitable in the future, the managers will feel pressured 
to make the market-favored investment even if they understand that it is 
suboptimal based on their superior, contrarian information.151 
Excessive concern about stock price effects also leads to earnings 
management, which can in turn lead to underinvestment.  In a world 
where institutional fund managers benchmark portfolios by reference 
to quarterly earnings per share (EPS),152 sensitivity to stock market 
reactions implies a focus on quarterly earnings numbers.153  Once 
management prioritizes meeting the market’s EPS expectations, in-
vestments that enhance long-term value but impair near-term earn-
ings may be delayed or foregone.154  Unsurprisingly, the more sensitive 
 
growth posture to present-profit maximization.  The manager devises strategies in a 
two-way feedback process with the market and so delays shifting resources from growth 
to cost cutting until such time as the market can appreciate the business wisdom of the 
shift.  Id. at 1027, 1042-43.  The delay is suboptimal, and the later change of direction 
is abrupt.  The more the manager cares about the stock price, the more dramatic the 
oscillation.  Id. at 1035.   
151 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- 
or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719, 720 (1993) (demonstrating that, 
where information about long-term investment is available to investors, overinvestment 
may result because long-term investment may be seen as a signal of a positive long-term 
outlook).  Carrying this out a step, similarly situated managers with reputational con-
cerns may “herd” into a subset of favored but suboptimal investments.  See Stein, supra 
note 137, at 132-33; see also Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law:  The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 672 (2006) (describing the connection between 
overvalued stock and value-destroying decisionmaking). 
152 See Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Price Obsession, FIN. ANALYSTS 
J., May–June 2005, at 65, 65 (discussing investors’ and managers’ “mutually reinforcing 
obsession with short-term performance”).  In addition, those who actively manage 
their portfolios tend to hold stocks for short periods.  Id. at 66-68.  
153 Managers have been shown to be more sensitive to accounting earnings than to 
cash flows.  See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Re-
porting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 6 (2005) (“[A]ccounting earnings matter more to man-
agers than cash flows for financial reporting purposes . . . .”).  
154 Investment activity can negatively impact near-term earnings because the 
amount funded must be expensed, as is the case with R&D costs.  Prioritizing earnings 
can also mean delaying other expenses, such as maintenance or advertising, even 
though management believes that present action enhances long-term firm value.  Al-
ternatively, managers making a capital investment decision can face a choice between 
one project with higher later cash flows and higher present value (but lower near-term 
earnings) and a project with higher earlier cash flows and lower present value (but 
higher near-term earnings).  For one study which examines such choices, see Sanjeev 
Bhojraj & Robert Libby, Capital Market Pressure, Disclosure Frequency-Induced Earnings/Cash 
Flow Conflict, and Managerial Myopia, 80 ACCT. REV. 1, 2 (2005).  Maximizing long-term 
value signals the first investment, while maximizing near-term EPS signals the second.   
 Numerous scholars have tested this empirically.  See Brian J. Bushee, The Influence 
of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 306-07, 
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a given CEO’s pay is to the stock price, the higher the level of earn-
ings management at the firm.155 
In summary, maximizing the corporation’s fundamental value and 
maximizing its stock price can amount to distinct objectives in the pres-
ence of information asymmetries.  Directors can attach a value to the 
corporation that is not only different from that reflected in the market 
price but better informed.  When directors opt to maximize the stock’s 
present appeal they may in the end sacrifice long-term shareholder val-
ue.  Consequently, managing to an underinformed market price holds 
out intrinsic risks for business policy, particularly investment policy. 
3.  Idiosyncratic Volatility 
We note that a recent line of empirical studies is thought to cut 
against the foregoing results.  These studies assert that the sharehold-
ers’ information asymmetry problem diminished substantially as the 
securities markets developed and deepened over the last half century.  
They track the quantum of stock price variation explained by move-
ments across the market as a whole, showing a substantial diminution 
over time, along with a concomitant increase in firm-specific, or “idio-
 
319-30 (1998) (showing that a responsive reduction of R&D spending is likely in firms 
with low institutional holdings, but that in firms whose predominant owners are insti-
tutions with high portfolio turnover and momentum trading strategies (“transient” 
institutions), earnings management through R&D cuts is very likely); Brian J. Bushee, 
Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run Value? 2-3 (Apr. 
1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=161739 (showing 
a weak institutional preference for near-term earnings amongst institutions as a whole, 
but a strong preference for near-term earnings within the transient subset, along with a 
concomitant tendency to hold companies whose stock is mispriced); see also Mei Cheng et 
al., Earnings Guidance and Managerial Myopia 1-4 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=851545 (using voluntary earnings guidance 
as a proxy for managing to the market).  There is also survey evidence of this phenome-
non.  See Graham et al., supra note 153, at 32-35, 35 fig.5 (surveying 401 chief financial 
officers and reporting that nearly eighty percent said that they would decrease discretio-
nary spending on R&D or advertising to meet earnings targets, and just over fifty-five per-
cent said that they would delay a new project despite a small sacrifice in value); see also 
John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions 9-10 (Sept. 
6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=871215 (re-
porting that only fifty-nine percent of the same group of executives would approve a high 
net present value project if it entailed missing earnings by $0.10). 
155 See Daniel Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings Man-
agement, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 511, 512-13 (2006) (finding evidence that CEOs whose com-
pensation is more closely tied to share price “more aggressively use discretionary com-
ponents of earnings to affect their firms’ reported performance”).  Otherwise, the 
underinvestment problem can be expected to be at its most acute when management 
has particularly strong incentives to please the market, as happens when new equity 
finance is needed or with takeover pressure. 
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syncratic” volatility.156  The more particular implication, according to 
proponents of one reading of the data, is that market traders have 
somehow obtained enhanced access to private information.157  How 
that might have happened, however, is not explained.  The evidence, 
moreover, is indirect, inferential, and in dispute.158  The literature 
holds out at least four competing explanations of the data,159 resulting 
in a state of explanatory gridlock. 
 
156 According to one study, it was thirty times higher in 1997 than in 1962.  See 
John Y. Campbell et al., Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile?  An Empirical Explo-
ration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1, 20, 24 fig.5 (2001) (showing that variance for a 
typical firm was thirty times higher in 1997 than in 1962, while the equally weighted 
average R2 statistic of a market model declined from 0.26 to 0.08 across the same pe-
riod).  The studies follow from Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. FIN. 541 (1988), which showed 
that market models could explain a lesser quantum of daily volatility than previously 
had been assumed.  Id. at 542-43.   
157 If that is the case, then the information asymmetry problem has been ameli-
orated to some extent.  Carrying this point a step further, some proponents posit that 
good managers look to the stock price to get good instructions for business policy, 
claiming not only well-informed but accurate stock prices.  See Artyom Durnev et al., 
Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?, 41 J. 
ACCT. RES. 797, 798-99 (2003) (evidencing an empirical connection between low R2 
and the informativeness of the stock price, and, by implication, its accuracy); Art Dur-
nev et al., Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-Specific Stock Return Variation, 59 J. 
FIN. 65, 89 (2004) [hereinafter Durnev et al., Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting] (find-
ing better-quality investment decisionmaking at low R2 firms, thus suggesting that in-
formative stock prices facilitate efficient investment); see also Qi Chen et al., Price Infor-
mativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 619, 620-23 (2007) 
(showing a further correlation between stock price variation and the sensitivity of the 
firm’s level of investment to its stock price).  
158 Even the studies’ authors point to their weaknesses:  the evidence as to price 
informativeness is only indirect, the implications are a matter of “theoretical conjec-
ture,” and other factors could be involved.  Durnev et al., Value-Enhancing Capital Budget-
ing, supra note 157, at 69; see also Chen et al., supra note 157, at 625 (“Admittedly, it is . . . 
possible that our measures are correlated with other factors . . . . We believe that our ex-
tensive robustness tests mitigate this concern to a large extent.  But, it remains possible 
that something else is behind our results.”).  Idiosyncratic volatility, then, does not prove 
that the price has become better informed and more accurate—it only suggests such. 
159 The stepped-up volatility could also reflect (1) trading “frenzy unrelated to 
concrete information,” Roll, supra note 156, at 566; (2) increased cash flow volatility 
within the companies, Campbell et al., supra note 156, at 37-40; (3) speedier informa-
tion dissemination over time, id. at 39; or (4) increased volatility in investor discount 
rates, id. at 39-40.  Empirical evidence has been marshaled to support each of the four 
alternatives.  See Steven X. Wei & Chu Zhang, Why Did Individual Stocks Become More Vo-
latile?, 79 J. BUS. 259, 261-62 (2006) (showing that a decline in return on equity and, 
hence, greater uncertainty explain the increase in volatility, and attributing two-thirds 
of the increased volatility to newly listed firms); Yexiao Xu & Burton G. Malkiel, Investi-
gating the Behavior of Idiosyncratic Volatility, 76 J. BUS. 613, 614 (2003) (finding from 
cross-sectional regressions that idiosyncratic volatility is related to trading volume, insti-
tutional ownership, and a growth posture); Michael W. Brandt et al., The Idiosyncratic 
Volatility Puzzle:  Time Trend or Speculative Episodes? 13-14 (Univ. of Tex. McCombs Sch. 
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Gridlock or not, evidence that the market has become better in-
formed does not by itself imply that information asymmetries have ac-
tually decreased.  Both public and nonpublic information may have 
improved, leaving the gap between the two unchanged.  Consequent-
ly, there is simply no evidence to prove the assertion that the gap be-
tween private and public information available to the market has nar-
rowed materially. 
C.  Heterogeneous Expectations 
We now turn to the emerging literature of heterogeneous expecta-
tions.160  This line of financial economics has developed in an attempt 
to explain pricing bubbles, but it has broader implications for the de-
bate over shareholder empowerment.  Not long ago, many thought of 
bubbles as historical anomalies that happened before financial markets 
became as efficient as they are today.  The historical parade of bubbles, 
 
of Bus., Research Paper No. FIN-02-09, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1141219 (conjecturing that idiosyncratic volatility is related to speculative euphoria); 
Jason Fink et al., IPO Vintage and the Rise of Idiosyncratic Risk 12-17 (Feb. 4, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661321 (showing a 
significant rise in idiosyncratic risk stemming from a drastic increase in the number of 
younger, riskier IPO firms in the market and demonstrating that after controlling for 
the proportion of young firms there is no time trend respecting idiosyncratic risk).  
 Other studies have begun to undermine some of the literature’s basic assump-
tions.  The conclusion that prices have become better informed is refuted by a study 
that ties the stepped-up volatility to increased opacity due to deteriorating accounting 
practices and increased dispersion of analysts’ forecasts.  See Shiv Rajgopal & Mohan 
Venkatachalam, Financial Reporting Quality and Idiosyncratic Return Volatility over 
the Last Four Decades 1-6 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=650081.  The consistent upward trend of volatility has also 
been challenged.  See Brandt et al., supra, at 6-8, 37 fig.2 (showing that the idiosyncrat-
ic volatility trend spiked during the period 2002–2004 and declined sharply thereafter 
through 2007, and identifying an earlier but shorter-lived trend toward increased vola-
tility during the period 1926–1933); Paul Brockman & Xuemin (Sterling) Yan, The 
Time-Series Behavior and Pricing of Idiosyncratic Volatility:  Evidence From 1926 to 
1962, at 12-14 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1117284 (documenting a downward trend in idiosyncratic volatility from 
1926–1962). 
160 For the original model, see Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of 
Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1151 (1977).  We do not claim to be the first to introduce this 
work in the legal literature.  For two papers that have previously discussed its implica-
tions, see Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks:  CAPM and ECMH Un-
der Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 482-91 (1997), 
and Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency:  An Introduction to the New 
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639-50 (2003).  For heterogeneous-expectations approach-
es to merger pricing, see Richard Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate 
Finance, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1053 (1991), and Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really 
Premiums?  Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990). 
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and the busts that followed, include the Dutch tulip bubble of 1630–
1637, the South Sea bubble of 1710–1720, the British railway boom 
from 1845–1846, the subsequent U.S. railway boom and bust in 1873, 
and the dramatic rise and crash of the U.S. stock market of the 1920s.  
But the bubble-to-bust experience of Japan between the 1980s and 
1990s161 and our own recent Internet bubble caused researchers to ask 
how such events can occur in a world where financial markets are 
thought to be generally efficient.  As a consequence, explanations for 
bubbles are being integrated into broader financial models. 
Heterogeneous expectations models integrate pricing bubbles in-
to the conceptual framework of “high church” financial economics by 
assuming rational behavior by all investors.  Investors are not only ra-
tional but assumed to have access to the same information, to employ 
standard valuation techniques, and to trade on fundamentals rather 
than on noise.  The models depart from the asymmetric information 
literature in two critical respects.  First, the models assume symmetric 
information not only among investors but between those inside and 
outside of the corporation.  Second, the models drop the classical as-
sumption of homogeneous investor expectations.  Here, each investor 
is informed by the same set of information but develops her own esti-
mate of fundamental value,162 an estimate that at any given moment 
may differ from the market price.  Some investors form more optimis-
tic expectations, while others are more pessimistic. 
Models with heterogeneity of expectations have three primary im-
plications for corporate governance:  (1) the market price may no 
longer represent the views of the shareholders as a whole or even of a 
majority of the shareholders; (2) the market price may not represent 
the pro rata value of the corporation; and (3) mispricing is likely to 
affect investment behavior within the corporation, and this investment 
behavior may be detrimental to the corporation. 
1.  The Models 
In the leading heterogeneous expectations models, investors 
overweigh their own estimates of firm value and undervalue the esti-
mates of other investors.  This generates optimists and pessimists and 
trading where the optimists buy stock from the pessimists.  As infor-
 
161 For a heterogeneous-expectations analysis of the Japanese bubble, see Robert B. 
Barsky, The Japanese Bubble:  A ‘Heterogeneous’ Approach (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 15052, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15052. 
162 This is frequently framed in terms of Tobin’s marginal Q. 
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mation flows, any particular investor may change from being optimis-
tic to pessimistic or vice-versa.  Such changes in position explain the 
high volume of trading that is typically observed during bubbles.163 
Critically, the models depict stock prices as having two compo-
nents:  first, the fundamental value of the stock; and second, the 
present owner’s option to sell her stock to an even more optimistic in-
vestor.164  The result is that, even in equilibrium, the stock price may 
exceed the valuation of the most optimistic investor.  Even as this in-
vestor values the firm based on optimistic expectations as to future 
value, the speculative component makes this investor willing to pay an 
even higher price for the stock because of the option value of selling 
the stock to an even more optimistic investor.165  As a result, prices can 
differ systematically from fundamental value. 
This prediction will sound radical to an observer steeped in 
ECMH and CAPM.166  But this literature in fact resonates quite well 
with “high church” financial economics.  We note three important 
points of connection. 
First, there is no claim that financial markets always operate in a 
state where heterogeneity of expectations causes prices to diverge 
from fundamental value expectations.  Heterogeneity is likely to occur 
when there is a change in technology, when glamour companies 
emerge, or when companies running newer businesses with less estab-
lished track records become an important part of the market.167 
Second, the literature yields a picture of bubbles that can be read 
together with semi-strong ECMH.  Bubbles have two defining empiri-
 
163 See José A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 111 
J. POL. ECON. 1183, 1185 (2003) (noting that optimists and pessimists oscillate, chang-
ing their forecasts as information flows). 
164 For the original model of speculative behavior in a marketplace, see J. Michael 
Harrison & David M. Kreps, Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogene-
ous Expectations, 92 Q.J. ECON. 323, 325-28 (1978).  
165 The more pronounced the differences of opinion among investors, the more 
salient the speculative element.  See Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and 
Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577, 578-80 (2006) 
(explaining the effects of differences of opinion on speculative behavior and thus fluc-
tuating stock valuation).  
166 If CAPM’s assumption of homogeneous expectation is relaxed, and some inves-
tors are well-informed while others are misinformed, the theory’s prediction no longer 
holds.  See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disagreement, Tastes, and Asset Prices, 
83 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 669 (2007) (concluding that disagreement between dissimilarly 
informed investors moves pricing away from CAPM). 
167 See Stavros Panageas, The Neoclassical Theory of Investment in Speculative 
Markets 22-23 (Apr. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=720464. 
BRATTONWACHTER_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2010  1:04 PM 
708 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 653 
cal markers:  (1) a period of rapidly rising prices followed by a subse-
quent collapse; and (2) an unusually high volume of trading that can-
not be explained by changes in fundamentals.  Under the first 
er, a bubble can only be identified after it has burst; rapidly rising 
stock prices do not constitute a bubble unless or until followed by a 
sharp decline or collapse.168  Ex post identification is not problematic 
for semi-strong efficiency, however, since there is no claim that a 
ble can be identified ex ante.  It follows that there is no implicit claim 
that a contrarian trading strategy can be developed that yields reliable 
profits from a bubble. 
Third, the models do assume constraints on short selling that pre-
vent arbitrageurs from eliminating upward bias in the stock price 
stemming from optimistic purchases.  This assumption might have put 
them outside the “high church” tent twenty years ago.169  Today, how-
ever, the economic literature recognizes real-world limitations on the 
arbitrage correction function.170 
 
168 For example, then–Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan made his famous 
speech on “irrational exuberance” in December 1996.  Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. 
Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research:  The Challenge of Central Banking in a 
Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm.  The stock market would come close to 
doubling over the next several years, with the bubble only bursting in late 2000. 
169 Traditional ECMH proponents never denied that many investors are unin-
formed and that their trading activities push the market price away from fundamental 
value.  They instead posited that mispricing presents a risk-free arbitrage opportunity 
and that the arbitrage corrective will be complete, assuring that stocks have flat de-
mand curves and insulating market prices from shocks stemming from shifts in supply 
and demand having no relation to fundamental value.  See Myron S. Scholes, The Mar-
ket for Securities:  Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Pric-
es, 45 J. BUS. 179, 179-82 (1972) (discussing various hypotheses regarding arbitrage 
opportunities resulting from market imperfections). 
170 Arbitrage in corporate stocks is risky.  Individual stocks do not have perfect 
substitutes.  Arbitrage hedges accordingly carry the risk that the two streams of returns 
do not cancel out.  See Jeffrey Wurgler & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Does Arbitrage Flatten 
Demand Curves for Stocks?, 75 J. BUS. 583, 585-86 (2002) (reporting the results of an em-
pirical test of stocks that join the S&P 500 and finding that no substitutes that would 
hedge away more than twenty-five percent of the daily return variance could be lo-
cated).  That risk must be compensated for by additional returns, which in turn cause a 
reduction in the number of attractive plays and reduce the volume of corrective trad-
ing.  The smaller the number of corrective traders, the more risky their plays become.  
Moreover, even if an arbitrageur’s fundamental-value analysis is flawless, a given play 
succeeds only when the rest of the market comes to share the analysis and moves the 
stock in the predicted direction.  As the time to correction lengthens, so does the 
play’s duration and risk.  All of this calls for a substantial base of capital, which further 
depresses the number of potential players.   
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2.  Implications for Business Policy and Corporate Governance 
The heterogeneous expectations models change a single classical 
assumption, homogeneous investor expectations, to drive a wedge be-
tween stock prices and fundamental value without resort to informa-
tion asymmetries.  Information asymmetry and heterogeneous expec-
tations thus emerge as separate tracks for projecting the potential 
adverse effects of managing to the market. 
a.  Implications for Shareholder Voting 
When shareholder proponents ask for shareholder voting on 
business-policy matters, they assume that the stock price offers a relia-
ble proxy for fundamental value and so provides the shareholders 
with informational guidance.  The information picture changes with 
heterogeneous expectations.  Increases in the speculative component of 
the stock price provide little or no information on fundamental value 
enhancement, and a shareholder basing a vote on market price infor-
mation could be greatly misled in supporting the company’s manage-
ment.  Shareholder voting would reward those companies whose prices 
had an increased speculative component.  As a consequence, managers 
interested in securing shareholder support for a business decision, such 
as executive compensation, would have an incentive to skew business 
policy in directions that excited speculative reactions in the market. 
 
 Regulatory and institutional constraints also dampen demand for shorting activity.  
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty 
Years Later:  The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 725-31 (2003) (analyzing the difficul-
ties of successful arbitrage in financial markets); see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 38-43 (1997) (positing a model for agency 
constraints on arbitrage activity).  But cf. Paul Asquith et al., Short Interest, Institutional 
Ownership, and Stock Returns, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 245 (2005) (showing empirically that 
only a handful of stocks on the U.S. markets are short-sale constrained due to an un-
availability of loanable shares).  The average ratio of short interest to shares outstand-
ing in February 2000 was only two percent.  See Eli Ofek & Matthew Richardson, Dot-
Com Mania:  The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J. FIN. 1113, 1118 (2003) 
(calculating average short interest to be approximately two percent of shares outstand-
ing as compared to almost three percent for Internet stocks).  This is an increase from 
a less than one-percent average during the period 1973–1979.  See Stephen Figlewski, 
The Informational Effects of Restrictions on Short Sales:  Some Empirical Evidence, 16 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 463, 471-72, 472 tbl.1 (1981) (listing the average short interest 
for stocks on the S&P 500 from 1973–1979 as a percentage of total stock outstanding). 
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b.  Implications for Business and Investment Strategy 
We now inquire into the distortionary potential of speculative 
prices for decisionmaking in corporate boardrooms, irrespective of 
shareholder voting.  The models have two noteworthy features:  first, 
their time frames cover only the period during which the bubble is 
still growing, thus excluding the effects of the bubble’s bursting;  
second, they assume that the managers’ duty is to maximize the stock 
price for the benefit of the current shareholders.  Given these para-
meters, what is a fiduciary to do in a speculative market? 
The directions are clear.  In order to maximize the wealth of the 
corporation’s current shareholders, management should first sell ad-
ditional overpriced stock, thereby effectively lowering the company’s 
cost of capital.171  Having sold the stock, managers should then ap-
prove increased capital expenditures.  In a model from Stavros Pana-
geas, this investment serves two “efficiency” purposes.  “One is to in-
crease the ‘long run fundamentals’ of the company according to the 
beliefs of the current owners,” since the high stock price presumably indi-
cates a high present value of growth opportunities.172  The other is to 
increase the speculative element, permitting the current owners to 
capture a larger resale value when they sell their stock.173 
José Scheinkman and Wei Xiong reach a similar conclusion.174  
Like Panageas, they see stock ownership as including an option to 
profit from other investors’ overvaluations.175  Patrick Bolton joins 
Scheinkman and Xiong by pointing this out in an article on executive 
compensation.176  In this model, executives divide their time between 
increasing the fundamental value of the corporation and increasing 
the value of the speculative component in the stock price.177  In order 
 
171 See Panageas, supra note 167, at 17 (noting that new investment does not in-
crease long-run fundamental value but rather short-term resale price). 
172 Id. (emphasis added).  
173 See id. (noting that the speculative element arises because of disagreement over 
the fundamental valuation of the corporation and captures the current owners’ resale 
premium). 
174 Their focus is on management self-interest, and they find that managers may 
themselves profit by adopting strategies that boost the option or speculative compo-
nent.  See Scheinkman & Xiong, supra note 163, at 1208 (“Firm managers may be able 
to profit by adopting strategies that boost the speculative component.”). 
175 Id. at 1184.   
176 See Bolton et al., supra note 165, at 578 (“The holder of a share then has not 
only a claim to future dividends but also an option to sell the stock to a more optimis-
tic investor in the future.”). 
177 See id. at 579 (explaining managers’ short-term behavior in terms of the specul-
ative component). 
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to maximize the wealth of the current shareholders, the optimal com-
pensation contract actually “overemphasize[s] short-term stock per-
formance to induce managers to take actions that may increase the 
speculative component in stock prices.”178  Indeed, “[w]hen it is possi-
ble for future investors to overvalue the firm due to their optimism, it 
is in the interest of current shareholders to cater to such potential 
sentiment even at the expense of firm long-term fundamental val-
ue.”179  In other words, it is in the interests of current shareholders for 
managers to have a short-termist view so as to maintain the speculative 
element in the stock price and give the current shareholders the pos-
sibility of selling to even more optimistic investors. 
To get a better sense of the models’ implications, hypothesize a 
stodgy technology company (hereafter “Stodgy”) in the year 1998, at 
the heart of the high-tech bubble.  Its managers want more momen-
tum in the company’s profile.  They get an opportunity to buy an In-
ternet operation that recently has gone public (hereafter “Cyber-
shares”).  Cybershares has never made a profit and is investing heavily 
in a number of innovative, web-related projects.  Prospects for reve-
nues, however, are shadowy.  Cybershares’ stock, initially sold to the 
public for $20, now trades at $60.  Stodgy’s managers negotiate the 
acquisition of Cybershares at a still higher premium price and submit 
the transaction to a special committee of its independent directors for 
approval.  The independent directors take a dim view of the Internet’s 
revenue-generating prospects and believe Cybershares to be over-
priced.  They do, however, expect the Internet price bubble to persist 
for at least the intermediate term, even as they perceive little funda-
mental value and predict an eventual bust.  The shareholders are ex-
pected to favor the merger overwhelmingly.  How should the inde-
pendent directors of Stodgy vote? 
Within the parameters of the heterogeneous expectations models, 
Stodgy’s directors should vote in favor of the acquisition because the 
models define their fiduciary duties in terms of present stockholders, 
and the deal holds out the benefit of a speculative price enhancement 
for the company’s stock that would generate present stock price max-
imization.  The result holds for investment policy in general:  even if the 
purchase of Cybershares reduces the fundamental value of Stodgy, the 
purchase improves the wealth of its current shareholders as long as the 
 
178 Id. at 578. 
179 Id. at 597. 
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increase in the speculative component of the stock price outweighs the 
diminution of value in the fundamental component of the stock price.180 
As already noted, the models focus only on pricing effects inside 
the bubble and do not factor in the likelihood of the bubble bursting.  
Let us relax this parameter in the merger case, allowing market partic-
ipants to factor in the possibility of an eventual pricing correction.  
We now find Stodgy’s directors facing a difficult choice.  An invest-
ment made to increase the speculative element in the price but lack-
ing in supporting fundamental value will benefit only those who sell 
before the bubble bursts, with longer-term holders and new investors 
left holding the deflated remains.181  The directors have no inside in-
formation but believe that the probability of the bubble bursting is 
higher than the probability assessment built into the market price.  
Unfortunately, the directors cannot convince the optimistic market 
that their own pessimistic expectations are correct.  As long as the 
bubble persists, it will appear that they turned down a good deal in 
the eyes of their shareholders. 
In the constrained context of the models, including their inter-
pretation of corporate law, the directors should ignore their own 
business judgment.  The result follows from the models’ assumption 
of symmetric information.  Given this, the directors’ conclusion differs 
from the market’s only with respect to subjective expectations about 
future outcomes; it does not follow from a position of informational 
superiority.  There is no reason for the directors to assume that they 
have a better answer than the market; accordingly, they should give 
the current shareholders what they want. 
c.  Implications for the Legal Model of the Corporation 
The prevailing legal model works differently because it instructs 
the directors to maximize the value of the “corporation” and not the 
stock price.  Remember that in the bubble models, the stock price has 
both a fundamental value component and a speculative component.  
In our hypothetical, the speculative component is positive, which is 
why the merger can reduce the fundamental value yet still result in a 
higher stock price.  The move to the legal model permits the Stodgy 
 
180 See Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Stock Market and Corporate Investment:  
A Test of Catering Theory, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 187-90 (2009) (arguing that managers 
may rationally make investments that decrease long-term value in order to secure 
short-term gains). 
181 See id. (arguing that shorter-term investors will benefit from “catering” on the 
part of management).   
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directors to take the fundamental value information into account in 
making their decision.  This gives them a basis to vote against the 
merger in accord with their own business judgment. 
Thus, the legal model, in holding out “corporate” value maximiza-
tion, opens up a zone of discretion.  Within it, Stodgy’s directors may 
ignore the most optimistic shareholders who set the market price.  
Because the legal model imposes no duty to manage to the market 
when the directors’ views about value differ from the market’s view, 
the directors have no duty to approve the merger simply for the pur-
pose of allowing those shareholders to sell their stock to more opti-
mistic shareholders.  More generally, the legal model permits the di-
rectors to consider a longer time horizon.  In the hypothetical, long-
term value is maximized accordingly. 
Compare this with the Cybershares merger case under a hypothet-
ical legal regime that models the directors as agents of the sharehold-
ers.  This makes the merger much more difficult to resist, reducing 
the zone of directorial freedom of action to maximize long-term val-
ue.  The market, which serves as a proxy for shareholder preferences, 
favors the deal.  Under an agency model, the principal’s preferences 
should control.  The directors can still vote against the deal, citing 
fundamental value as a defense.  But this defense no longer provides a 
complete answer under the law because it privileges the interests of 
one subset of principals (the pessimistic, long-term holders) over 
another (the optimistic, short-term holders).  Here, where the as-
sumption of a unitary shareholder has failed, the board must choose 
winners and losers within the group of principals.  Arguably the mar-
ket price, as objective money on the table, holds out the more prin-
cipled decision rule.182 
d.  Controlling Shareholders Compared 
In the above cases, directors face a dilemma in exercising their 
business judgment when it conflicts with the views of their sharehold-
 
182 What of the impact of the shareholder franchise in the hypothetical?  More 
facts would be needed.  If the directors approve the merger, the subsequent share-
holder vote will be in favor of the merger, but only so long as the bubble has not yet 
burst.  Indeed, if the pessimistic shareholders are not locked into their shareholdings, 
they will vote yes on the ground that the best course in the wake of board approval is to 
vote yes and sell.  Only shareholders that, for whatever reason, cannot sell will vote no.  
If the board turns down the merger, no shareholder vote occurs.  The shareholder 
franchise comes into play at the next annual meeting.  If the bubble has not burst, the 
directors presumably will be punished.  Indeed, even if the bubble has burst, share-
holders may still be inclined toward punishment due to the missed opportunity to sell. 
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ers as expressed in market prices.  The heterogeneous expectations 
models contrast the case where there is a controlling shareholder, po-
siting that controlling shareholders are likely to have a longer-term ra-
ther than a shorter-term outlook.183 
The incentive shift toward long-term value maximization arises be-
cause the controller cannot or does not want to sell her shares, despite 
what she believes to be an inflated price.  Constraints on the ability of 
controlling insiders to sell their stock have a number of sources, includ-
ing IPO-related resale restrictions and negative tax consequences from 
capital gains realization.  Perhaps more importantly, the sale of a large 
enough block causes the seller to lose her power as a controller.184 
The locked-in controller will adopt a conservative investment poli-
cy consistent with the view that she will still be in control when the 
bubble bursts and the speculative component of the stock price goes 
to zero.  In particular, she has no incentive to consider speculative mi-
spricing when determining investment policy and no reason to accept 
negative-net-present-value investments that increase the value of the 
speculative component.  On the other hand, the controlling share-
holder can profitably adopt one prong of the noncontrollers’ short-
termist strategy by causing the firm to sell additional shares into the 
overpriced market, thereby lowering the firm’s cost of capital.  Since 
the funds so raised need not be used for investment purposes, they 
can be put aside to repurchase the shares after the bubble has burst.185 
e.  Implications for Management Compensation 
The perverse effects predicted by the models follow only to the ex-
tent that the managers have the option of selling into the market and 
do not hesitate to exercise it.  As we have seen, when frictions prevent 
sales, the managers have no stake in managing to the speculative ele-
 
183 See Panageas, supra note 167, at 21 (“Long-termism is just the extent of ‘entren-
chment’ of current ‘major’ shareholders in the firm.”).  
184 The controller might also face insider trading restrictions under Rule 10b-5.  
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).   
185 See Bolton et al., supra note 165, at 595 (explaining that during speculative epi-
sodes, “the cost of capital is below the firm’s long-run value”).  The reduction in the 
cost of capital is consistent with the controller’s belief that the expected return on the 
shares will be lower in the future. 
 Note that the controlling shareholder’s time horizon lengthens to the extent that 
access to the trading markets is restricted.  Given a partial constraint on liquidation of 
its position, the firm’s investment policy would be partially open to short-term incen-
tives—the controlling shareholder would determine investment using “some weighted 
average between share price and long term value.”  Panageas, supra note 167, at 22. 
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ment in the stock price, and fundamental value information deter-
mines investment policy.186  It follows that equity-based compensation 
schemes that lack constraints on market sales exacerbate the subop-
timal-investment problem.187  It also follows that compensation plans 
should seek to mimic as closely as possible the incentives of a control-
ling shareholder, the shareholder who will be deterred from selling 
into an overpriced market by the need to maintain the control posi-
tion and its accompanying value.188 
Now consider the impact of shareholder empowerment respecting 
the terms of compensation plans, given these choices.  Presumably, 
shareholders who are asked the hypothetical question of whether they 
prefer directors to have long- or short-term incentives will most of the 
time express a preference for the long-term.  This is because the long-
term strategy maximizes the current stock price, at least in normal 
times when stocks trade without a speculative element.  Given these 
conditions, shareholders can be expected to support compensation 
plans that constrain executive resales. 
Contrast this with a company that has an upward-trending stock 
price subject to speculative influence.  Here, shareholder voting prefe-
rences should shift to follow the stock price.  After all, if the stock price is 
inflated, it is because the shareholders have bid it up in the hope that 
the trend will continue.  Resale constraints are undesirable because they 
would discourage the managers from stoking the trend.  From a policy 
perspective, then, shareholder empowerment can work at cross-purposes 
with the goal of reducing value-destroying short-termist behavior. 
D.  Summary 
We have shown that information asymmetries can open a gulf be-
tween managing to maximize long-term fundamental value and manag-
ing to maximize the market price of the stock.  We have also shown that 
speculative pricing under heterogeneous expectations can have the 
 
186 See Stavros Panageas, Speculation, Overpricing, and Investment—Theory and 
Empirical Evidence 17 (Nov. 15, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
icf.som.yale.edu/pdf/seminar03-04/stravros.pdf (noting that if managers do not have 
frictionless access to markets, investment decisions are based on fundamental value). 
187 See Bolton et al., supra note 165, at 578-79 (explaining that an incentive com-
pensation scheme keyed to short-term stock price enhancement at the sacrifice of 
long-term value can be optimal for a group of speculative shareholders).  
188 Short-termist incentives will not, however, be entirely absent.  A controlling share-
holder retains the incentive to sell additional shares into the overpriced market in order to 
reduce the cost of capital, an incentive shared with all managers of all companies.  
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same result.  In both cases, managing to the market leads to suboptimal 
results, with negative implications for shareholder empowerment. 
When market prices are taken as governance inputs they according-
ly need to be interpreted as a matter of business judgment.  In our view, 
the prevailing legal model gets it right when it remits the judgment to 
the directors and their appointed managers.  A recent empirical study 
confirms that directors do indeed use their discretion to the advantage 
of fundamental value.  The study finds that managers look to the stock 
price when investing only in limited circumstances, and when so doing 
they successfully separate the fundamental value signal from the spe-
culative signal.189  This positive report card underscores the case favor-
ing the prevailing legal model’s zone of directorial discretion. 
IV.  SHAREHOLDERS, MANAGERS, MARKETS, AND THE  
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 
In this Part we turn to the recent financial crisis and the claim that 
shareholder empowerment is the regulatory response that will restore 
trust in the system.190  Leading executives of financial firms—particularly 
those whose firms had to be saved by the federal government—have 
emerged as the poster children for the evildoers who caused the crisis.  
But did the problem arise because the managers were fiduciaries who 
violated the shareholders’ trust, or because the managers were acting 
more like agents by managing to the market?  Does manager culpability 
translate, as Arthur Levitt would have us believe,191 into a case for share-
holder empowerment?  Or did the shareholders take the lead on the 
road to crisis, rewarding the financial companies that took on the most 
leverage with higher stock prices, and penalizing those that did not? 
In Section A we examine the financial crisis through the lens of 
the shareholders of the financial firms at its epicenter.  In so doing, 
we highlight the place of managing to the market in the chain of cau-
sation.  As we show, the evidence suggests that shareholders first fell in 
love, and then fell out of love, with the financial companies that were 
taking on the most risk and the most leverage.  In Section B we turn to 
the question of the proper role of corporate governance in post-crisis 
 
189 See Tor-Erik Bakke & Toni M. Whited, Which Firms Follow the Market?  An 
Analysis of Corporate Investment Decisions 3 (Nov. 18, 2006) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891570 (finding “that investment does 
respond to legitimate information in price movements, but only for firms that rely on 
outside equity financing and whose shares are not mispriced” (emphasis added)). 
190 See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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law reform, focusing on executive compensation and its central role 
both in fomenting the crisis and in fixing the system.  Doing so re-
moves shareholder empowerment from the reform picture. 
A.  Financial Risk and Shareholder Inputs 
Figure 2 tracks the performance of the subset of bank stocks in-
cluded in the S&P 500 index against that of the entire S&P 500 from 
January 2000 to March 2009.  It shows that prior to the autumn of 2007, 
the banks handsomely outperformed the market as a whole, in rough 
correlation with its ups and downs.192  They then underwent a precipit-
ous fall that presaged and outstripped that of the market as a whole, 
which began a year later.  We note that Figure 2 understates the perfor-
mance gaps.  The relative weight of the financial sector within the S&P 
500 grew from 13.0% in 1999 to 22.3% in 2006,193 only to retreat back to 
13.6% in mid-2009.194  It follows that the S&P 500, excluding finance, 
neither rose nor fell as much as the line indicates. 
The stock market favored the banks between 2000 and 2007 be-
cause of rising earnings that resulted from wide spreads between ex-
pected returns on lending and the costs of increasing leverage in a 
stable economic environment.  The problem, which became more 
and more apparent in 2007, was that the banks had been making 
high-yield loans into the residential-mortgage sector (including, but 
not limited to, subprime loans) that were much riskier than had been 
appreciated.  Securitization195 had turned these risky loans into AAA 
paper on the assumption that the price of the real estate securing the 
loans would continue to rise.196  At the same time, the rise in real es-
tate prices was built in part on increasing demand for housing fueled 
by ever-riskier real estate financing.197 
 
192 The correlation of the two number series is 0.48. 
193 Bespoke Investment Group, Current and Historical Sector Weightings of the 
S&P 500 (Apr. 24, 2008), http://bespokeinvest.typepad.com/bespoke/2008/04/ 
current-and-his.html. 
194 Select Sector SPDR Trust, Sector Returns by Year 1999–2009, at 2, http:// 
www.sectorspdr.com/shared/pdf/SPDR-Periodic_table-web.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 
2010). 
195 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994) (explaining how securitization works and how companies bene-
fit from it). 
196 See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Market Shock:  AAA Rating May Be Junk, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
2007, at C1 (explaining the riskiness of AAA securities backed by subprime mortgages). 
197 See, e.g., Andrey Pavlov & Susan Wachter, Subprime Lending and House Price Volatility 
3 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-33, 2009), available at 
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Figure 2:  S&P 500/S&P 500 Banks, 2000–2009 
 
Was the crash of financial stocks the result of a system that gave 
managers too much power, or did it follow from managers catering to 
stockholders as they expressed their views through stock prices?  Some 
evidence to answer the question can be found by breaking out indi-
vidual financial stocks that were the poster children of the crisis, with 
each playing a different role.  Figure 3 depicts the individual share 
prices of Countrywide Financial, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of Amer-
ica against the S&P 500 Bank index.  Countrywide is now one of the 
clear villains in the story.  But it also was the clear market favorite, at 
least until mid-2007.  Countrywide expanded at a torrid pace after 
2000 by making riskier loans, both in the subprime and prime sectors, 
and financing the expansion on a short-term basis in the repurchase 
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1316891 (linking recent use of ag-


























































































BRATTONWACHTER_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2010  1:04 PM 
2010] The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment 719 
and commercial paper markets.198  Countrywide’s line in Figure 3 
stops in mid-2008 because portfolio losses forced it into a defensive 
merger with Bank of America. 
It appears the stock market failed to appreciate the risks held out 
by the sector’s higher fliers.  In our view, this lack of appreciation can 
be traced partly to the information asymmetry problem described in 
Section III.B.  As we noted there, markets can easily fail to measure 
the risk factors incorporated into discount rates.199  What was unusual 
here was the magnitude of the underestimation. 
A full account of these events is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but a few useful points should be noted.  Banks historically have been 
low-beta stocks.  The banks, operating with less leverage than recently 
has been the case, made their profits on the spread between borrow-
ing and lending rates.  Since this spread does not generate enormous 
returns, the banks were steady earners with high dividends.  Further-
more, by doing their best to match the duration of their assets with 
 
198 In 2003, Countrywide was the star of its sector, having returned 23,000% on its 
equity between 1982 and 2003.  See Shawn Tully, Meet the 23,000% Stock, FORTUNE, 
Sept. 15, 2003, at 204 (“Most amazing of all is that Countrywide boasts the best stock 
market performance of any financial services company in the FORTUNE 500 . . . .”).  
Countrywide built itself into an industry leader with a strictly prime-lending operation, 
entering the subprime market only in 1999.  Between 1999 and 2003, Countrywide got 
its growth in earnings and market share from an aggressive mortgage refinancing op-
eration.  That strategy depended on historically low interest rates.  When rates climbed 
in 2003, it had to look elsewhere to continue its stellar performance.  See Christine Ri-
chard & David Feldheim, Asset-Backed Securities Gain Favor, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2004, at 
C5 (concluding that investors were moving money into asset-backed securities, creating 
a possible “bonanza” for consumer borrowing).  Subprime lending was a part of the 
solution but only undertaken with a view to securitizing all mortgages originated.  
Prime lending remained a much greater part of the business.  But here the company 
took a notably aggressive approach, originating adjustable-rate mortgages highly ex-
posed to declines in real estate prices.  See James R. Haggerty, Do Countrywide’s Loans 
Stack Up?, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2006, at C3 (raising the possibility that Countrywide was 
less cautious than rivals in granting adjustable-rate mortgages).  The right side of 
Countrywide’s balance sheet also changed.  Shareholders’ equity, sixteen percent of 
total assets in 1999, declined to seven percent of total assets in 2006.  Compare Coun-
trywide Credit Indus., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Feb. 29, 2000), with 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-3 (Feb. 28, 2008).  In 1999, 
the overwhelming portion of Countrywide’s outside borrowing was medium term.  By 
2006, it was relying on short-term credit in the form of repurchase obligations and 
commercial paper.  See Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-3 
(Feb. 28, 2008) (reporting that repurchase obligations, while constituting 0% of liabili-
ties in 1999, were 23% in 2006, while longer-term “notes payable” declined from 79% 
of liabilities in 1999 to 39% in 2006). 
199 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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their liabilities and maintaining large reserves of safe, liquid assets, 
they contained their risk, and hence their returns.200 
 





















This all changed as some banks made riskier loans, became more 
involved in buying and selling securitized assets, and operated with 
more leverage.  Such a change in business strategy meant a move to 
greater expected returns and greater risk.  In the stable economic en-
vironment of 2003–2007, these banks generated much higher profits 
with little volatility.  The stock market fell in love with this combina-
tion of unexpectedly high returns and apparently constant low risk.  
Higher stock prices resulted. 
For a management dedicated to maximizing shareholder value, the 
instruction manual was clear:  get with the program by generating more 
risky loans and doing so with more leverage.  Any bank whose managers 
failed to implement the new math of high returns and low beta got 
 
200 For a description of the process by which banks went from regulatory con-
straint to high-risk investing, see RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM:  THE 
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stuck with a low stock price.201  For an example, look at JPMorgan Chase 
in Figure 3.  It suffered from loan and other investment losses from 
2001 to 2004, and then, as the housing bubble expanded, recovered 
while adhering to strict risk-management policies.202  Consequently, its 
stock lagged behind the bank index until the crisis began to unfold and 
then overtook the index.  Unsurprisingly, its managers labored under 
considerable pressure to follow the strategies of competing banks.203  
JPMorgan Chase had merged with a view to dominating the securitiza-
tion business.204  In 2005, the new bank cranked up a production line 
for collateralized debt obligations based on subprime mortgages but 
never flicked the start switch because its managers could not find a way 
to make the risk/return numbers add up.205 
As long as the economy was expanding, the riskier business strate-
gies worked well.  But when the economy slowed, the higher risk be-
came observable.  High returns went along with higher risk after all, 
and the realization caused stock prices to fall. 
Now let us turn back the clock to 2005 and hypothesize a newly 
appointed CEO at a bank that has been pursuing the high-
growth/high-leverage strategy.  The bank has been originating mort-
gages, both prime and subprime, whose soundness depends on con-
tinued rising real estate prices.  Although it funnels most of its sub-
prime originations into securitizations, some of these mortgages will 
be retained on its increasingly levered balance sheet.  How would this 
CEO evaluate the policy?  The stock market has been sending a strong 
signal that the shareholders love the new approach.  If the CEO is 
shareholder sensitive, she will be inclined to view the new strategy as 
terrific.  If that is the case, then the bank’s fortunes are set.  However, 
suppose the new CEO, who has had a long banking career, believes 
that the market is underestimating the risk of the high-growth/high-
return strategy built around originating risky mortgages on a more le-
vered balance sheet.  The new CEO accordingly decides against taking 
 
201 For a smaller bank, that meant becoming an attractive merger target as the in-
dustry concentrated. 
202 See KATE KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS:  THE LAST 72 HOURS OF BEAR STEARNS, THE 
TOUGHEST FIRM ON WALL STREET 194-96 (2009) (describing JPMorgan Chase CEO 
Jamie Dimon’s approach as “steer[ing] the bank away from risky holdings”); GILLIAN 
TETT, FOOL’S GOLD:  HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS 
CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 110-142 (2009) 
(“Dimon believed strongly that risks must be properly managed . . . .”). 
203 TETT, supra note 202, at 125-42. 
204 Id. at 120.   
205 Id. at 121-28. 
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on more leverage and orders the managers to stop originating both 
subprime mortgages and “teaser rate” mortgages, prime mortgages 
requiring no down payment, and instead orders them to sell off as 
many as possible, even if that means realizing a loss and incurring 
other transaction costs. 
Does the CEO’s insightful move improve the stock price?  The 
bank, which is forced to lower its earnings forecast substantially, can 
fully explain the development as a return to a lower-risk corporate 
strategy that it believes will pay off when the economy cools and the 
returns on the subprime mortgages turn negative.  But the result of 
not giving the market what it wants can be painful.  The new corporate 
policy is unlikely to be rewarded precisely because the stock market be-
lieves the existing high-leverage corporate strategy, duly ratified by a 
rising stock price, is the correct one.  The hypothetical thus ends with 
the bank’s stock price dropping substantially and the managers’ stock 
options going underwater.  The story, in short, tracks Part III’s analysis 
of the problems confronting managers making investment decisions 
given speculative stock pricing under heterogeneous expectations. 
Now return to the question asked in this Article’s Introduction:  
would increased shareholder power have moderated the bank’s risky 
business practices?  We think the answer is no.  While many of the 
CEOs of adversely affected financial institutions certainly must have 
agreed with the strategy, some might not have.  It is not as if contra-
rian warnings were not on the table for all to see.  The Economist began 
a series of warnings about real estate price bubbles in 2002.206  Manag-
ers at JPMorgan Chase saw warning signs in the subprime market in 
2005 and so decided to stay out.207  Insiders at other banks must have 
posited similar conclusions.208  The question is whether increased 
shareholder empowerment would have emboldened these informed in-
siders into abandoning the strategy so popular on Wall Street or would 
have deterred them.  The inference from the evidence lies clearly with 
the latter result.  Citigroup’s then-CEO, Charles Prince, spoke publicly 
of his own second thoughts in 2007, late in the game.  He chose to stick 
 
206 See To Burst or Not to Burst?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2002, at 68 (warning then–
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to look out for a boom in share prices or 
house prices combined with a big increase in debt and overinvestment by firms).  The 
warning became more focused by 2004.  See Will It Be Different This Time?, ECONOMIST, 
Oct. 9, 2004, at 22 (predicting a crash of the U.K. housing market).  
207 TETT, supra note 202, at 122-24. 
208 Cf. Kara Scannell & John R. Emshwiller, Countrywide Chiefs Charged with Fraud, 
WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, at C1 (reporting SEC allegations that Countrywide executives 
saw warning signs and decided not to disclose that information to investors).  
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with the program despite his second thoughts:  “When the music stops, 
in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. . . . But as long as the 
music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.  We’re still dancing.”209  
His upwardly bouncing stock price surely set the motivating rhythms.210 
The financial sector undertook high-risk/high-return strategies to 
enhance return on equity and raise stock prices.211  The executives 
who danced to the rhythm were compensated with stock options and 
restricted stock in addition to cash bonuses, and so had incentives 
roughly in alignment with those of their shareholders.212 
At least in retrospect we know that the market underestimated the 
risk being taken and thus failed to provide an objective, critical refer-
ence point for monitoring purposes.  To the contrary, stock prices 
confirmed the strategies until well past the point of no return.  We 
think that Arthur Levitt got it exactly wrong.  Shareholder power was a 
part of the problem and is not a part of the solution. 
 
209 Stephen Kotkin, A Bear Saw Around the Corner, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at BU2 
(reviewing and quoting from JAMES GRANT, MR. MARKET MISCALCULATES:  THE BUBBLE 
YEARS AND BEYOND (2008)). 
210 A recent empirical study of executive compensation at financial companies 
compares those that did badly in the financial crisis (such as AIG, Bear Stearns, Citi-
group, Countrywide, and Lehman) against those that did better (such as Berkshire Ha-
thaway, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo).  Ing-Haw Cheng et al., 
Yesterday’s Heroes:  Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking 5-10, 22-26 (Oct. 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502762.  The study 
finds (a) a statistically and economically significant connection between executive 
compensation and price-based measures of risk such as beta and stock return volatility; 
(b) that higher-paying firms were more likely to be in the tails of performance; and (c) 
a positive relation between residual compensation and subprime exposure.  Id.; see also 
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 1, 12 
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 256/2009, 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 (reporting on an empirical study and showing 
“that there is no evidence that banks with a better alignment of CEOs’ interests with 
those of their shareholders had higher stock returns during the crisis and some evi-
dence that banks led by CEOs whose interests were better aligned with those of their 
shareholders had worse stock returns and a worse return on equity”). 
211 See, e.g., William D. Cohan, Op-Ed., A Tsunami of Excuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2009, at A23 (criticizing the testimony of financial executives to Congress who alleged 
that the financial crisis was unavoidable). 
212 The mix among stock options, restricted stock, and cash bonuses varied from 
company to company and from executive to executive within each company.  For ex-
ample, in 2006, Citibank disclosed a heavier weighting to cash bonuses, whereas Bank 
of America relied more on stock options.  Compare Citigroup Inc., Definitive Proxy 
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 39-52 (Mar. 14, 2006), with Bank of Am. Corp., Defini-
tive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 22-27 (Mar. 20, 2006).   
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B.  The Changing Policy Context 
Financial collapse reorients policy agendas.  Is the shareholder 
agenda helped or hurt by these developments?  As noted above, a 
large clientele believes that market exuberance can be fixed by giving 
shareholders more say.  We think the policy implications go in the 
opposite direction.  What is needed is incentive compatibility for 
managers.  Incentive compatibility and shareholder accountability, 
however, do not yield the same results. 
We noted in Part III that the heterogeneous expectations models 
have an important implication for executive compensation plans.213  
Equity-based incentive-alignment schemes need to filter out specula-
tive market inputs.  Long-term holding constraints, whether attached 
to restricted stock or stock options, are the means to the end.  Profes-
sors Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano recommend prohibiting re-
sales of eighty to eighty-five percent of the equity granted until two to 
four years after the manager leaves the company, with such restric-
tions extending down the hierarchy to cover bonus plans for traders.214  
The idea is to drive a wedge between the incentives of shareholders 
who are active in the market and those of managers.  As we also noted 
in Part III, managers taking equity compensation under resale restric-
tions resemble blockholders more than the dispersed shareholders on 
whom reform proponents continue to focus. 
The manager/shareholder wedge has a second significant effect.  
Market shareholders tend to diversify their holdings in order to mi-
nimize risk.215  Resale-constrained managers are underdiversified and 
presumptively carry more risk than portfolio investors.  As they bear 
more risk they tend toward risk-averse investment strategies.  Thus 
does the emerging consensus favoring strict resale constraints reverse 
long-held views respecting equity-based compensation, views shaped 
 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 186-88. 
214 Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation:  Focusing 
and Committing to the Long-Term 7, 12-13, 15-16 (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 
374, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336978.  The authors reason that a 
two-year minimum suffices to diffuse the incentive to manage earnings; by the end of 
four years the intermediate-term effects of the manager’s contribution will have 
worked their way into the stock price.  Id. at 7. 
215 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 30 (1991) (“[T]he vast majority of investments are held by people with 
diversified portfolios.”); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation:  Managerial 
Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 858-59 (2002) (fac-
toring free transferability and hedging into the opportunity cost of a stock option). 
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during the 1980s.216  Stock options, which build in sensitivity to upside 
gain and insensitivity to downside loss, long have been deemed the 
compensation mode of choice because they counterbalance the risk 
aversion that accompanies the undiversified investments of human 
capital that executives make in their companies.  Up until now, man-
agement stock resales have been viewed as a matter for contractual 
trade-off—because they make it possible for the executives to diversify 
their investment portfolios, they increase the value of the compensa-
tion plan to the recipient and so reduce costs of compensation to the 
corporate employer and its shareholders.217 
The times have changed.  Even bank CEOs now acknowledge a 
need for boards to be scrupulous about compensation structures and 
incentives, toward the goal of “trust restoration.”218  Bhagat and Ro-
mano, even as their proposal addresses the TARP compensation con-
straints for financial companies, nonetheless commend its resale re-
strictions for the boards of all publicly traded companies.219  Bebchuk 
and Spamann go farther still, at least with regard to TARP recipients, 
contending that any equity-based compensation scheme holds out a 
possibility of incentivizing excessive risk taking, due to the combina-
tion of high leverage and the equity’s limited liability.220  They rec-
ommend basing incentive compensation on enterprise value rather 
than shareholder value—that is, rewards should be based on the value 
of a package of common stock, preferred stock, and bonds.221 
 
216 See generally Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-
Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 261-62 (1990) (finding the relation be-
tween executive wealth and shareholder wealth to be small, partly because executive 
compensation structures were not highly sensitive to performance at the time). 
217 Critics of compensation plans have questioned this analysis in part, recommend-
ing resale restraints that balance the long-term time horizon with the executive’s interest 
in liquidity and diversification.  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 130, at 174-76 (conclud-
ing that the efficient balance between restrictions on cashing out vested options and ex-
ecutives’ interest in liquidity and diversification will vary from firm to firm).  But cf. Wil-
liam W. Bratton, Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, and the Volatile Shareholder Interest, 1 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 55, 75 (2006) (recommending across-the-board resale constraints).  
218 See Green, supra note 5, at 3 (“Public trust depends on a responsible, measured 
attitude to compensation.”). 
219 Bhagat & Romano, supra note 214, at 3-4. 
220 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay  3-4 ( John M. 
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 641, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410072. 
221 Id. at 5-6; see also Viral V. Acharya et al., Corporate Governance in the Modern Finan-
cial Sector (recommending a focus on return on assets rather than return on equity), in 
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY:  HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 185, 193-94 (Viral 
V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009). 
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These new views on executive compensation bespeak a seismic 
shift in thinking about shareholder-manager relations.  Compensation 
is the margin on which business policymakers align the incentives.  
Formerly, the shareholders were seen as a unitary population for 
whose interest the stock price provided a robust proxy.  Now we see 
that at certain critical times the shareholder interest can disaggregate, 
with some shareholders’ interests diverging from near-term stock 
price maximization.  In such times, maximizing the market price pro-
vides faulty instructions to managers, undermining the claims of 
shareholder proponents and supporting the need for managers to ex-
ercise their business judgment independently.  Recent changes in no-
tions about appropriate management incentives accordingly come as 
no surprise.  The new model, which seeks to cast management in the 
mold of a long-term holder, may be more hypothetical than descrip-
tive of actual shareholders at many companies. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article bases its case against shareholder empowerment on 
the modern financial economics of market pricing.  It cites informa-
tion asymmetry and new financial economic theories of speculative 
overpricing.  We underscore the importance of the new economics by 
reference to bank stocks during the period 2000 to 2008—a reference 
that leads ineluctably to consideration of the implications of the fi-
nancial crisis for corporate law’s political economy.  There, on the 
critical topic of executive compensation, we already see the share-
holder interest, as manifested in the market price, retreating in the 
corporate governance system’s rearview mirror. 
Shareholder proponents will object, pointing out that banks are 
different.  Their businesses are built on assets and liabilities with mis-
matched durations, necessitating a protective deposit-insurance re-
gime.  That in turn holds out moral hazard in the form of speculative 
investment, with prudential regulation following to square the circle.  
Producers of goods and services in other sectors do not hold out these 
special risks.  As to them, the shareholder case remains intact, or so 
goes the argument. 
We see it differently.  Our case, albeit brought home at the ex-
treme, is not thereby limited.  We have shown that excessive reliance on 
market pricing poses problems for corporate governance.  We certainly 
do not claim that shareholder inputs shaped by market prices are in-
trinsically unreliable.  We do claim that mispricing is a salient possibili-
ty, more so in times of economic volatility.  It follows that price signals 
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need to be interpreted by an agent exercising sound business judg-
ment, with the independent board of directors bearing that burden. 
The shareholder case, in contrast, follows from a theory that 
merges agency-cost reduction, value maximization, and price signals 
into a unitary whole to yield a one-size-fits-all governance instruction.  
This Article breaks open this holistic theoretical construct.  Once that 
is accomplished, the shareholder proponents have no riposte because 
they have never thought it necessary to confront the difficulties of ba-
lancing the benefits and detriments of market inputs and to restate 
their case in a realistic cost-benefit framework. 
We have no idea what such a robust shareholder empowerment 
case might look like.  Pending its articulation, we think any reform fol-
lowing from the shareholder agenda to be inopportune in the present 
context.  The prevailing governance system has proven itself quite 
responsive to market inputs.  Shareholder power has waxed over the 
past several decades as an endogenous market response to changes in 
the economic environment.  The high residual agency costs of thirty 
years ago have been cured by cost-effective increases in market moni-
toring and director bonding.  Money on the table has that effect. 
Now, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, the question 
is whether the self-adjusting market mechanism proved overly respon-
sive to shareholder pressure by staking executive fortunes on short-
term price effects.  If the financial crisis teaches us anything, it is that 
managing to the market is the problem that needs to be addressed.  
That calls for recalibration of compensation mechanisms, not legisla-
tive change to increase shareholder power. 
More generally, today’s regulatory questions concern the constraint 
of business discretion in the wake of market failure, in particular, risk 
taking in pursuit of shareholder gain.  Despite the shareholder propo-
nents’ recent reframing of their case in terms of trust, shareholder em-
powerment remains what it always has been—a strategy that looks to 
regulatory reform that enhances market control over the zone of discre-
tion in which directors make business judgments. 
Regulatory reform strategies henceforth could proceed in the op-
posite direction.  The pure financial incentives that advantage share-
holder inputs in expansive, deregulatory times register equivocally in 
the face of public demands for control of market risk taking.  Debates 
on executive pay are beginning to bear out this point.  Regulations 
that seriously address risk taking will bypass the shareholders to im-
pose constraints on financial corporations directly, narrowing their 
zone of freedom of action.  As between managers and shareholders, 
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such initiatives cause power to flow the managers’ way.  With regula-
tion comes the responsibility to comply, a burden that falls on direc-
tors and officers.  The more extensive the forthcoming regulatory in-
tervention, the more irrelevant the shareholder empowerment 
strategy will become.  This strategy has, in our view, reached the outer 
limits of its effectiveness for the time being. 
 
